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ABSTRACT 
 This work focuses on the unique U.S.-Russian counterterrorism partnership. 
Following 9/11, the two states identified terrorism as a mutual enemy that posed utmost 
concerns to their national securities. Despite decades filled with antagonism, their 
teamwork reached unprecedented levels of cooperation on a multiplicity of matters; 
counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and nuclear security are three concerns which this 
research centers on. Areas of such collaboration include multidimensional efforts in 
Afghanistan to eradicate drugs, to build infrastructure and to train Afghan police and 
military to fight the Taliban and to eliminate its sources of funding, which mostly come 
from the narcotics trade. The goal is to build the capacity of local Afghan forces that will 
be in charge, and responsible for protecting their country and people once the NATO 
troops withdraw in 2014. While efforts in Afghanistan have been significant in areas of 
education and training of Afghan military personnel, the larger issues of the Taliban and 
illicit drugs have not been solved. In fact, data show a significant increase of cultivation 
of opium since 2002. A severe amount of corruption together with the weak economy 
makes it nearly impossible for any progress to be made, because farmers cultivating 
opium have great economic incentives and weak alternatives. This thesis essentially 
concludes that the lingering mistrusts of the Cold War impede greater cooperation 
between Russia and the U.S., and that while the two powers have made notable progress 
in taking preventive measures to secure nuclear facilities, their counterterrorism efforts in 
Afghanistan have not been as successful.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The United States and Russia have historically had antagonistic relations and 
competed for global power, dominance and nuclear arms during the Cold War, but have 
since improved their bilateral relations because of the newly emerged, shared threat of 
international terrorism. Today, the two states have reached unprecedented levels of joint 
collaboration in a number of different dimensions including intelligence sharing and joint 
military operations, while co-chairing bilateral and multilateral international 
organizations aimed at preventing security, economic and world stability threats. This 
thesis examines the different ways in which the United States and Russia have cooperated 
in counterterrorism efforts. The multidimensional irony of the partnership should not go 
unnoticed: only twenty some years ago, the U.S –Soviet Cold War threatened the peace 
and stability of the entire world; today the two have reversed the cold relations, striking a 
warmer tone at the outset of the new century. Likewise, during their struggle for world 
dominance, the Soviet Union and the United States engaged in a proxy war in 
Afghanistan: the U.S. supported the mujahedeen fighting against Russian communist 
expansionary efforts, supplying funds and resources through Pakistan; such support at the 
end helped spawn what we today know as international terrorism. The irony is not only 
that the U.S. efforts against the Soviet Union ended up contributing to America’s (and 
Russia’s) foremost international security threat today, but also that Russia and the U.S. 
are now working together to stabilize the geographical locus of that threat, which is 
Afghanistan. Despite the increased collaborative efforts, the two nations still have a long 
way to go. The Cold War has left behind suspicion and mistrust between them despite 
complex bilateral ties, often slowing down progress in their evolving new relationship 
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and in their continued joint operations. Nevertheless, there are many areas of cooperation, 
which this thesis explores in detail, and in order to understand this unique partnership one 
needs to understand the history and the perceptions of terrorism held by these two states, 
which are explored in the first two chapters. The former explores terrorism in the United 
States and Russia prior to the September 11 attacks, and then attempts to determine the 
extent to which 9/11 influenced domestic policies and international relations. The chapter 
also argues that there is a shade of difference in the way the United States and Russia 
define and perceive terrorism. Such a disparity can be witnessed clearly in the opposing 
U.S. and Russian views on Chechnya. The U.S. perceives the conflict as an ethnic 
uprising, whereas Russia believes it is a case of international terrorism. The following 
chapter, Terrorism in Russia, explores Russian terrorism concerns in detail and traces the 
roots of the issue to Afghanistan. As a mutual national security threat, terrorism has 
brought the two nations closer together. Such cooperation is detailed in the U.S.-Russian 
Collaborative Counterterrorism Efforts chapter, where Afghanistan is portrayed as the 
greatest area of cooperation in counterterrorism between the two states. Therefore, U.S.-
Russian efforts in Afghanistan account for a large portion of this chapter, concentrating 
mostly on counternarcotic efforts, infrastructure development, and military training of 
local Afghan forces. The last chapter, Diminishing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, 
focuses on the U.S.-Russian efforts to secure nuclear facilities in Russia and in the former 
Soviet Union states. Furthermore, the chapter evaluates the nuclear threat in Pakistan and 
North Korea; Iran is discussed in the addendum. 
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WHAT IS TERRORISM? 
 
 The term “terror” was first used in 1789, after the French Revolution, to describe 
the Jacobin ‘Reign of Terror.’1 The eighteenth century British philosopher Edmund 
Burke condemned "those hellhounds called terrorists."2 A surge of violence that 
welcomed the decades of the late 1900’s, urged the 20th century thinkers to categorize the 
new threat in a class of its own. The attacks strived to achieve terror hand in hand with 
political change and the motivating factor seemed to be different from the more common 
acts of criminality. For decades, legal scholars, academics, lawyers, national and 
international bodies of governments have struggled to formalize the new concept of 
terrorism. Decades after, no single definition is recognized, supported and followed by 
the entire international community. Therefore, this chapter will not serve the purpose of 
defining terrorism. It will rather explore different approaches that nations take when 
coining the term, and how different perceptions of the concept affect the collaboration of 
the international community, more specifically the United States and Russia. 
 It is important to note that there is a difference between non-state terrorism and 
state terrorism. Non-state actors who do not represent the beliefs, values and the political 
agenda of any particular country inflict terrorism internationally, against nations which 
they usually don’t consider their homeland. Non-state actors don’t have a home per se; 
they are an international collaboration of like-minded and usually extremist-in-thought 
group of people who fight for the same cause. On the contrary, state terrorists inflict 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John F Murphy, “Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out of the Quagmire” Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights, (1989) 13, 14. 
2 David Bosco. "An indefinable problem," Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 62, No. 1 
(January 2006): 44-51. 
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terrorism from within the country to which they belong. Similar to non-state terrorists, 
they are also usually extremists in thought and opinion and use terrorism as a political 
tool. 
 There are two main methods used to define terrorism: the specific and the general. 
The specific approach attempts to comprise particular activities that would apply as 
terrorism, such as hijacking of an aircraft or a railway train, or hostage taking. The 
general approach is more wide-ranging. Instead of citing possible incidents, it focuses 
more on motivation, intention, purpose, and so forth.3 Different governments have 
adapted different approaches to formalizing law, most of which take shape of the 
specific, the general, or a combination of the two. Both methods carry capacity for logical 
fallacy. The specific model does not account for rapid innovation in our developing 
world; therefore, as technological improvements advance, new ways of conducting 
terrorism may emerge. The specific model then calls for frequent law modification. 
According to one scholar, a law too unequivocal may also be unjust.  
Referring to individual ‘acts of terrorism’ might not be capable of capturing what 
we mean by terrorism. A specific offence may not include the elements that 
distinguish a terrorist act from other criminal acts, and this can be a concern 
where additional penalties are imposed for terrorism.4 
 
In line with such reasoning, terrorists could moreover evade accountability for a terrorist 
act by being arraigned for only ordinary criminal charges. In nations where disorderly 
decision making persists, a specific approach may be favored as it “avoids political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ben Golder, George Williams, "What is 'Terrorism'? Problems of Legal Definition," 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 270, (2004).	  	  http://www.austlii.edu.au.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/au/journals/UNSWLawJl/2004/22.html	  
4 Ibid. 
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conflict over basic definitional principles” and, also because it “[permits] textual 
agreement to be reached.”5  
 The general approach therefore is preferred. Governments’ certainty that threats 
to which they are responding are actually of terrorist nature would allow for quicker 
responses.  
In any event, the specific approach lacks the wider moral-political appeal of 
the general approach, which can lead to a stronger statement about the 
indiscriminate use of violence to attain political, religious or ideological ends.6 
 
Nevertheless, a general approach must strictly relate to terrorism and ensure that other 
acts of violence do not get swept under the same category. Too much ambiguity could 
essentially allow for negligent, unfair and contrivable decision-making by the 
government.  
 Now, does such an array of definitions impact the global collaboration in 
counterterrorism? This disparity in definition strategies among single countries reflects a 
divide in international organs, such as the United Nations. “Debates on terrorism often 
resemble a conversation in different languages: one camp speaks the language of 
methods, while the other side talks about causes.”7 Secretary-General Annan, in a 
meeting of the League of Arab States in 2005, noted that the United Nations’ efforts to 
impede terrorism have been weakened by the absence of a ‘clear and agreed definition.’8 
For one, the lack of a clear international definition poses a challenge when formulating 
and or implementing international counterterrorism agreements. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Geoffrey Levitt, “Is ‘Terrorism’ Worth Defining?” Ohio Northern University Law 
Review, (1986) 97. 
6 Ben Golder. 
7 David Bosco,"An indefinable problem," 1. 
8 Secretary-General's Address to the Summit of the League of Arab States, March 23, 
2005. 
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Once states agree on a common definition of terrorism, bilateral and regional 
extradition treaties could enable more effective prosecution of perpetrators. 
Efforts like the Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims to halt proliferation 
at sea, could expand to cover the transport of terrorists. Existing U.N. 
resolutions designed to prevent incitement to terrorism and to dry up terrorist 
funds could acquire some teeth.9 
 
The disagreement of nations on a formal list of terrorist organizations hinders not only 
the collaborative performance, but also individual efforts. Consider from the Turkish 
perspective the case of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK),10 a labeled terrorist 
organization in Turkey. The PKK’s international television station ‘Roj TV’ is 
broadcasted in Denmark, meanwhile Turkey deals with the terrorist issues at home.11 
Likewise, the U.S. and Russia use different approaches to define terrorism, which often 
impedes their joint counterterrorism efforts. A broader, clear definition, accepted by both 
nations, would better the efficiency and effectiveness of their collaboration against 
terrorism.  
The U.S. View on Terrorism 
“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end, until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated. This is 
civilization’s fight; we ask every nation to join us. Every nation, in every region, now has 
a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” 
 
 George W. Bush 
Definition 
 
 The United States does not have a unified definition of terrorism within its own 
borders. Agencies such as the Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 David Bosco. 
10 Kurdish Translation: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan.  
11 "All Countries Should Agree on Definition of "Terrorism," Turkish Speaker," BBC 
Monitoring European, November 27, 2005, 1. 
http://search.proquest.com.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/docview/459623700?accountid=1458.  
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Investigation (FBI) use a different interpretation. The multiplicity of definitions brings a 
sense of ambiguity to how distinctive agencies respond differently under the same roof, 
and what they consider a terrorist threat. Nevertheless, every agency would only act 
within the scope of its mandate. The Code of Laws of the United States of America 
however, has defined terrorism under two different titles: Title 18, the Federal Criminal 
Code and Title 22, the Foreign Relations and Intercourse. The law distinguishes between 
international and domestic terrorism and gives both a broad description, following the 
general approach of defining terrorism, as shown in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 
The U.S. Federal Criminal Code. Title 18, Section 2331 of Chapter 113(B): 
International Terrorism: 
 
(A) Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation 
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a 
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or 
of any State; 
 
(B) Appear to be intended -(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,  
or kidnapping; and 
 
(C) Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or 
transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or 
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.1 
 
The Central Intelligence Agency uses Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d):1 
(1) The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving the territory 
or the citizens of more than one country; 
(2) The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents; and 
(3) The term “terrorist group” means any group that practices, or has 
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significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.1 
 
Domestic Terrorism:  
 
(5) The term "domestic terrorism" means activities that -         
 
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or of any State;            
(B) appear to be intended -               
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of 
a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and             
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.1 
 
  
John Brown and Osama bin Laden 
 
 In recent U.S. history, violent attacks and mass casualties inflicted by non-state 
actors have signaled a surge of international terrorism. The Pentagon’s first serious 
concern with terrorism began as a result of the 1979-1981 hostage crisis in Tehran. 
Iranian nationalists held fifty-three Americans captive at the U.S. embassy in support of 
the Iranian Revolution.12  
In the 1970s and the 1980s, terrorism had been tied to regional conflicts, mainly 
in the Middle East. The majority of terrorist groups either were sponsored by 
governments or, like the Palestine Liberation Organization, were militants trying 
to create governments.13 
 
Prior to September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist suicide truck bombings on U.S. Marines and 
the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar el Salaam, 
Tanzania, and the bombing of the U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Cole claimed 
the lives of nearly 300 Americans. While taking the threats seriously, the U.S. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton, “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” Washington, 
DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States” (2004). 
13 Ibid.,92. 
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government did not take the threat as seriously as it would have if it were an attack by 
another country. Therefore, the government did not respond as forcefully as it would to 
challenge an enemy “of the first, second, or even third rank.”14 Hardly anyone knew of 
Osama bin Laden.  
…Neither in 2000 nor in the first eight months of 2001 did any polling 
organization in the United States think the subject of terrorism sufficiently on the 
minds of the public to warrant asking a question in a major national survey. Bin 
Laden, al Qaeda, or even terrorism was not an important topic in the 2000 
presidential campaign. Congress and the media called little attention to it.15 
 
The first time bin Laden appeared on the U.S. radar was in 1992 when the State 
Department noticed his money trail leading to the Yemeni terrorists attempting to bomb 
the U.S. troops in Aden.16 The following year, Ramzi Yousef, an al Qaeda affiliate, 
masterminded the first bombing on the World Trade Center in 1993, killing a few and 
injuring over a thousand. The attack signaled not only a new challenge for America, but 
also inspired Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) to architect the 9/11 plane hijackings. 
His reasoning behind the attacks lay in thinking that he could best influence the U.S. 
policy by harming the country’s economy.17 
President Clinton’s counterterrorism Presidential Decision Directives in 1995 
(no.39) and May (no.62) reiterated that terrorism was a national security problem 
not just a law enforcement issue. 18 
 
As late as 1997, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Osama bin Laden unit, believed 
him to be an “extremist financer,” but soon discovered his military actively planning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States,”340. 
15 Ibid.,341. 
16 Ibid.,109. 
17 Ibid.,153. 
18 Ibid.,108. 
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attacks against the U.S. worldwide.19 The hijacking of the four planes on September 11, 
2001, by nineteen al Qaeda terrorists, impelled President George W. Bush to wage war 
on terrorism. Two planes crashed into the North and South towers of the World Trade 
Center Complex, one hit the Pentagon; and the fourth, which may have targeted the U.S. 
Capitol in Washington D.C., crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. 
  Nonetheless, the wave of international terrorism that swept the late 20th century 
was not the only time the U.S. had dealt with terroristic figures and their organizations. 
Some scholars argue that the first signs of terrorism date back to the American Indian 
Wars, beginning with the Pequot War of 1637.20 However, American Indian conflicts 
more likely fit the categories of small wars, coups and raids. John Brown, an American 
abolitionist, on the other hand, has often been viewed as the first American terrorist. In 
the North he was regarded as a man of righteousness, but “for Southerners, he was the 
embodiment of all their fears—a white man willing to die to end slavery—and the most 
potent symbol yet of aggressive Northern antislavery sentiment.”21 In 1856, Brown led a 
spontaneous raid to Pottawatomie Creek where he and his men spared some, but 
interrogated, tortured and killed a number of proslavery settlers.22 Arguably, his raid on 
Harpers Ferry can also be viewed as an act of terror, where Brown and his companions 
seized the U.S. arsenal at Harpers Ferry in Virginia. The men inflicted terror on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States,”,109. 
20 Robert Ben Mitchell, “American Terrorism 1637-2000: A Counterbalance to History,” 
(2010). http://www.trafn.com/american_terrorism_042010.pdf.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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citizens as they captured slave-owners, killed a small number of men and seized a 
passenger train.23 
 The Ku Klux Klan (KKK), a network of white, native-born, Protestant U.S. 
citizen supremacists, founded in 1866, is known to be the oldest U.S. terrorist 
organization.24,25 The KKK, notorious for its discriminatory views and persecuting 
actions against all viewed as not ‘racially-pure,’ especially those of African American 
dissent, has terrorized the American public for nearly 150 years.26  
Throughout its history, factions of the secret fraternal organization have used acts 
of terrorism—including murder, lynching, arson, rape, and bombing—to oppose 
the granting of civil rights to African Americans.27 
 
The KKK continues to be the major source of domestic terrorism today. Its presence in 
the U.S. remains very strong, particularly in the Southern and Midwestern states. Tens to 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue are lost in communities around the country 
where Klan marches and rallies take place.28 While the U.S. knows how to, more or less, 
handle KKK matters, it was not ready nor organized enough to handle any international 
terrorism threats.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 David S. Reynolds, “John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked 
the Civil War, and Seeded Civil Rights,” New York City: Random House Inc., (2005). 
24 West’s Encyclopedia of American Law. “Ku Klux Klan,” The Gale Group Inc., (2005). 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Ku_Klux_Klan.aspx#1.   
25 Keith J. Akins, "The Ku Klux Klan: America’s Forgotten Terrorists," Law 
Enforcement Executive Forum. 
26 West’s Encyclopedia of American Law. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. 
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The Evolution of the U.S. Policy Concerning Terrorist Threats 
 
 
 Prior to September 11, the United States was not prepared for challenges posed by 
international terrorism because much of the Cold War mentality remained. The State 
Department led the counterterrorism policy throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as it was the 
primary means of communication between the U.S. and the governments affected by 
terrorists. The counterterrorist role of the State Department suited the time period because 
most terrorist incidences were resolved through negotiations led by embassy officials.29 
After 9/11, the disparity between domestic and foreign threats was evident. “The 
domestic agencies did not know what to do,” and were left without direction. On the 
other hand, the agencies abroad, having had experience with such threats, had a 
“playbook” and needed no direction.30 Unprepared to deal with terrorism, the U.S. missed 
a number of opportunities to prevent 9/11.  
Information was not shared, sometimes inadvertently or sometimes because of 
legal misunderstandings. Analysis was not pooled. Effective operations were not 
launched. Often the handoffs of information were lost across the divide separating 
the foreign and domestic agencies of the government.31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States,” 94. 
30 Ibid., Roger Cressey Interview,  June 23, 2004, 264. 
31 “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States,” 353. 
 
“…For example, the case of Mihdahr, Hazmi, and their January 2000 trip to Kuala 
Lumpur. The National Security Agency (NSA) analyzed communications associated with 
a man named Khalid, a man named Nawaf, and a man named Salem. Working-level 
officials in the intelligence community knew something more about this. They correctly 
concluded that Nawaf and Khalid might be a part of an operational cadre and that 
something notorious might be afoot. NSA did not think its job was to research these 
identities. If NSA has been asked to identify these people…NSA’s analysts would 
promptly have discovered who Nawaf was, and that his full name might be Nawaf al 
Hamziand. [With this information] managers could have more effectively tracked the 
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The FBI held the responsibility for domestic intelligence gathering on terrorism; 
however, its Director, during the Clinton Administration, had little communication 
with the President and shared little information with the National Security Council. 
Thus, the relationship was highly ineffective.32 Since 9/11, terrorism emerged as the 
foremost U.S. national security issue. The United States has greatly increased 
government spending on national security and defense. In 2001, Congress passed the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), today a branch of the Homeland Security Department. TSA 
was created to ensure the security of the U.S. transportation systems by working 
closely with the law enforcement and intelligence communities.33 The following year, 
in 2002, the Homeland Security Act and the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
were also passed to strengthen homeland security.34,35  
 Today, the CIA holds outmost responsibility for detecting terrorist threats and 
the FBI and the Justice Department are far more engaged domestically. The Defense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
movement of these operatives in southeast Asia… The information arrived at Bangkok 
too late to track these travelers as they came in.”  
 
32 Ibid.,358. 
33 The Department of Homeland Security; Transportation Security Administration. 
www.tsa.gov.  
34 The Homeland Security Act: Sec. 101. Mission: (a) Establishment. - "There is 
established a   Department of Homeland Security, as an executive department of the 
United States within the meaning of title 5, United States Code.  (b) Mission (1) In 
General. - The primary mission of the Department is to  (A) prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States;  (B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; 
and  (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do 
occur within the United States."--U.S. Department of Homeland Security. www.dhs.gov. 
35 The Maritime Transportation Security Act: It was designed to strengthen port and 
waterway security. Department of Homeland Security: United States Coastguard. 
https:homeport.uscg.mil.  
	  	  
	   	   14	  
Department has expanded to unprecedented measures, with counterterrorism as its 
primary concern on all levels. The State Department has focused on foreign policy 
tasks, while the National Security Council (NSC) and the Homeland Security Council 
are now joined by “a presidential advisory structure” at the White House, to ensure 
communication and flow of information across the board.36  
 The Russian Perspective on Terrorism 
Definition 
 
 Like the United States, Russia’s concern regarding terrorism has grown over the 
years. Currently, such a threat is considered a high priority on Russia’s security list. 
Nikolay Kovalev, the Director of the Federal Security Service in 1997, listed three types 
of terrorism that threaten Russia: “social, which aims at political and economic changes; 
nationalist and ethno-separatist; and religious.”37, 38 Counterterrorism measures that 
Russia has taken throughout history have followed “Russia's 
understanding of terrorism as an attack on the state rather than an assault on individual 
rights.”39 Chechnya is considered to be the foremost terrorist threat; one that is believed 
to have international characteristics and that encompasses all three types of terrorism 
defined by Russia. The law regarding terrorism was first introduced in 1994 after Russia 
responded to eighteen threats that year.40 In 1997, the law was refined, but remains a part 
of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, and uses the specific approach to define 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States,” 401. 
37 Mark A Smith, “Russian Perspectives on Terrorism,” Conflict Studies Research 
Center, (2004). 
38 Gordon Bennett, “The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation,” 
http://da.mod.uk/CSRC/Home/. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Mark A Smith, “Russian Perspectives on Terrorism.” 
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terrorism. The text of the law refers and connects to different titles of the criminal code 
(Table 2). Unlike the United States, Russia does not differentiate the threat by domestic 
or international origin. Russian Procurator General, Vladimir Ustinov, “argued that the 
existing legislation was imperfect, as it failed to provide adequate definitions of what 
constituted terrorist crimes, and what constituted a terrorist organization. [He believed 
that the 1997 law] “defined terrorism too narrowly, which made it difficult to develop an 
effective national counter-terrorist policy.”41, 42 Ustinov also criticized the clause 
regarding counterterrorism, arguing that many situations in Chechnya are not covered by 
the current law, thus the definition needs to be broadened.43  
TABLE 2 
          The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which came into force on January 1, 
1997, defines terrorism in Section IX, Chapter 24. Article 205 states: 
 
1. Terrorism, that is, the perpetration of an explosion, arson, or any other action 
endangering the lives of people, causing sizable property damage, or entailing 
other socially dangerous consequences, if these actions have been committed for 
the purpose of violating public security, frightening the population, or exerting 
influence on decision-making by governmental bodies, and also the threat of 
committing said actions for the same ends, shall be punishable by deprivation of 
liberty for a term of five to ten years. 
 
 
2. The same deeds committed: 
    a) by a group of persons in a preliminary conspiracy; 
    b) repeatedly; 
    c) with the use of firearms, 
shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of eight to fifteen years. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Mark A Smith, “Russian Perspectives on Terrorism.” 
42 Vladimir Ustinov, ‘The Legal Regulation and Mechanisms of Counteracting Terrorism 
and 
  Extremism in the Russian Federation: The Active Normative Legal Base and Prospects 
for Improving it,” Gosudarstvo i Pravo, July 2002, 30-45.  
“State Anti-Terrorist Strategy: General Conception and Legal Aspects,” Gosudarstvo i 
Pravo, March 2003, 5-18. 
43 Ibid. 
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3. Deeds stipulated in the first or second part of this Article, if they have been 
committed by an organized group or have involved by negligence the death of a 
person, or any other grave consequences, and also are associated with 
infringement on objects of the use of atomic energy or with the use of nuclear 
materials, radioactive substances or sources of radioactive radiation, shall be 
punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of 10 to 20 years. Note: A person 
who has taken part in the preparation of an act of terrorism shall be released from 
criminal responsibility if he facilitated the prevention of the act of terrorism by 
timely warning governmental bodies, or by any other method, unless the actions 
of this person contain a different corpus delicti. 
 
          Article 205.1. Involvement of a Person in the Commission of Crimes of 
Terrorist Nature or Otherwise Assisting in Their Commission: 
 
1. Involvement of a person in the commission of the crime stipulated by Articles 
205, 206, 208, 211, 277 and 360 of this Code or persuading a person to 
participate in a terrorist organization, the arming or training of a person with the 
aim of perpetrating the said crimes as well as the financing of an act of terrorism 
or an terrorist organization shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a 
term of four to eight years. 
 
2. The same deeds perpetrated by the person repeatedly or through the use of his 
official position shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of seven 
to fifteen years with confiscation of property, or without such confiscation.44 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Section Ix. Chapter 24: Crimes against 
Public Security; Article 205: Terrorism; Article 205.1 Involvement of a Person in the 
Commission of Crimes of Terrorist Nature or Otherwise Assisting in Their Commission.  
 
Article 205.1.1 includes the following Articles: Article 205: Terrorism. Article 206: 
Hostage Taking; Article 208: Organization of an Illegal Armed Formation, or 
Participation in It; Article 211: Hijacking of an Aircraft, a Sea-going Ship, or a Railway 
Train; Article 277. Section X. Chapter 29: Encroachment on the Life of a Statesman or a 
Public Figure and Article 360. Section XII. Chapter 34: Assaults on Persons or 
Institutions Enjoying International Protection 
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A Brief History 
 
 Russia’s sensitivity toward any offensive taken against its state can be traced back 
to the Mongol invasion. The Mongol-Tatar Yoke, occupying Russian lands from the 12th 
to 15th century, has largely influenced Russian political culture. As Prince Ivan III 
instigated собрание (sobranye), gathering of Russian lands, Russia rid itself of the Tatar 
control and emerged as a very militarized and a highly centralized autocracy.45 Although 
no longer a formal autocracy, present-day Russia has inherited much of the political 
culture that has been passed on by the tsars and communistic Bolsheviks of the 20th 
century. Likewise, the concept of terrorism is not a new phenomenon to the Russian 
regime. Narodnaya Volya, translated as ‘The People’s Will,’ emerged in Russia in 1879. 
It stands as the first ever known rebel, terror movement.46 The insurgents sought: 
“A radical transformation of society, the group’s members understood terrorism 
as a temporary necessity to raise the consciousness of the masses and selected 
victims for symbolic reasons—that is, for the emotional and political responses 
their deaths would have.”47  
 
Terroristic movements occurred at different times throughout Russian history. During the 
Bolshevik and Soviet regimes, terrorists were motivated by political discontent. 
Bolsheviks employed terror tactics to counter bourgeois terrorism and later, the Soviet 
government identified capitalist governments as a threat against the communistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Dr. James W. Warhola, Professor at the University of Maine, “Politics of Russia,” 
Lecture.  
46 David C. Rapport, “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism,” 
Current History, (2001), 419. http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/Rapoport-Four-
Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf.  
47 Ibid. 
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regime.48, 49 Present day Russia, having preserved the centralization of power by giving 
its president great supremacy, has allowed for a more single-handed control over political 
issues, including terrorism. This unilateral access to power is partly the reason why 
Russia does not have a clear distinction between domestic and international definitions of 
terrorism. A vague categorization gives the regime more latitude when deciding which 
measures to take to counter violence and at whom to aim. 
 Today, most of Russia’s terrorist problems are domestic in nature, coming from 
the Russian region of Chechnya. Islamic extremists who made their way from 
Afghanistan during the 1990’s have, to some extent, played a hand in the radicalization of 
the Chechen Muslims. However, it is important to understand that Russia’s struggles in 
Chechnya predate the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the recent emergence of 
extremists as a result of the conflict. The so-called Caucasian Imamate was a state 
established by the Chechen and Dagestani imams in 1824. Under the leadership of the 
imams, Chechnya and Dagestan have fought a number of wars against the Russian 
absorption. Nevertheless, in 1859 the Russian victory led to incorporation of the Imamate 
into the empire.50 Chechnya remained in opposition to Russian rule ever since the 
conquest, taking every opportunity to show its dissatisfaction through many rebellions.51 
During the Second World War, Chechens were believed to be cooperating with the 
Germans and as a result, Stalin ordered their exile to Kazakhstan. An estimated quarter of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Omelicheva, Mariya, "Russia’s Counterterrorism Policy: Variations on an Imperial 
Theme," Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 3, No, 1 (2009). 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/61/html.  
49Andrei Shoumikhin, "Deterring Terrorism: Russian Views,” National Institute for 
Public Policy, February 2004.  
50 Svante E. Cornell, “The War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: A Case 
for Distinction,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Volume 27, No. 2 (2003). 
51 Ibid. 
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the population died of cold, hunger and epidemics.52 But, in 1957, they were allowed 
back home. Along with the other former Soviet Union republics, at the collapse of the 
USSR in early 1990s, Chechnya declared its independence, but was not granted 
autonomy. The Russian leadership, then under Boris Yeltsin, decided to ‘solve’ the 
Chechnya problem instead, because the only oil pipeline extending to the Black Sea is the 
one running from Azerbaijan through Chechnya’s capital Grozny.53 The government 
feared losing its business opportunities and connection to the rich oil fields on the coast 
of the Caspian Sea. Thus, two Chechen-Russian wars followed throughout the 1990s. 
These struggles helped intensify the shade of difference that existed between Russia and 
the United States.  
 A Shade of Difference 
 
 The United States and other Western states disagree with Russian violation of 
human rights in Chechnya, such as the mass killing of Chechen people. Because 
Chechnya is still considered a Russian republic, the U.S. perceives it more as an ethnic, 
national conflict rather than one of a terrorist nature. Some terrorist organizations are 
officially recognized by both nations, but there is also a shade of difference. National 
interests and beliefs guide both countries, which reflects in the difference in the 
recognized lists of terrorists (APPENDIX A, B). For instance, Russia recognizes 
“Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan” as a terrorist network whereas the 
United States does not. Although Russia’s terrorist list is more specific in listing what 
type of actions would fall under the category, it also leaves room for ambiguity, allowing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Carlotta Gall and Thomas De Waal, “Chechnya: A Small Victorious War” 
Basingstoke: Pan Books, (1997) 56-75; Ibid. 
53 Svante E. Cornell. 
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the government to stomp around the definition. This shade of difference has brought 
some challenges to the collaboration table between the two nations, impeding progress at 
times, but it has not prevented the two powers from working together, as explained in the 
later chapters.  
The difference between Russia and the United States is well explained by Dmitry Babich, 
The Voice of Russia radio station’s political analyst. When asked to assess levels of 
homegrown terrorism in the U.S. today, Babich replies: 
 It’s very hard for me to speak from Russia about the level of terrorism in the US, 
but I think that for many years it was clear that the foreign policy was, at least, 
strange. Although Russia never made any hostile moves towards the US since 
1987, probably – since Gorbachev came to power – the US continues suspecting 
Russia of having different values. And it always supported groups, sometimes-
militant Islamic groups, which challenged Russia. I mean, of course, president 
Clinton didn’t support the Chechen separatists, but then if you read the American 
press of the time and if you read even certain articles, which appeared on the 
website of the New York Times today, you can see a lot of simplistic thinking 
about the so-called Chechen Uprising and the Islamist groups in the North 
Caucasus. The American newspapers say that Russia is to blame for all of these 
terrorist activities. Well, I don’t agree with that. I think that Russia was actually 
fighting a genuine international Islamism threat in the North Caucasus, at least, 
during the second Chechen War (in 1999-2000). Obviously, this Islamist activity 
in the North Caucasus is not only a threat to Russia. It’s also a threat to the US. 
It’s also a threat to Europe, but somehow the Western countries just refuse to 
recognize it.54 
 
It is evident that the two powers are aware of their differences. But, the question is how 
successful will their counterterrorism collaboration be if they cannot even agree on basic 
matters? It is in Moscow’s economic interest to keep the North Caucasus region stable 
and under control. Recognizing these opposing forces as terrorists, which Moscow 
genuinely believes they are, actually allows Russia to exercise a special kind of power to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 RT, “Russia Warned U.S. of Chechen Immigrants,” April 19, 2013. 
http://on.rt.com/ftkx3m.  
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defend its homeland. She has a wider-rang of options, because it could respond as it does 
against an international threat; such exercise of power has helped her keep political 
control over Chechnya.  However, terrorism issues in Chechnya still persist and are 
explained more fully in the following chapter. 
 
TERRORISM IN RUSSIA  
 
 Russia’s 21st century terror problem is a blend of political discontent, partially 
fueled by religious extremists pouring in from outside her borders. Much of the terrorism 
that Russia battles against currently dates from the era of the Cold War, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, and the disbandment of the USSR. Chechnya and the 
congregation of radical Islamists in the North Caucasus region represent a concern to 
Russia’s national security.  
During the Cold War, geopolitical interests mostly motivated the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan. Moscow’s 40th Army invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, 
in order to support the communistic government of the People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA).55  
At the time, the United States had been making headway in the Middle East at 
Moscow’s expense, successfully courting Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 
and others. The Soviet Union feared the loss of its communist proxy in 
Afghanistan.56 
 
The war depleted the Soviet Union economically as billions of rubles were spent to fund 
the war.57 Meanwhile, the United States indirectly provided arms and funds to Afghani 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Institute for the Study of War, “Russia and Afghanistan.” 
http://www.understandingwar.org/russia-and-afghanistan.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
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mujahedeen through the Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence (ISI), in order to help defeat 
the Soviet Union and consequently, to restrain the spread of communism.58 Islamic 
jihadists were given an opportunity like never before to hone their military capabilities 
and to build up their troops in CIA sponsored training camps.  
With the active encouragement of the CIA, [Saudi Arabia], and Pakistan's ISI, 
who wanted to turn the Afghan jihad into a global war waged by all Muslim states 
against the Soviet Union, some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 40 Islamic countries 
joined Afghanistan fight between 1982-1992. Tens of thousands more came to 
study in Pakistani madrasahs. Eventually more than 100,000 foreign Muslim 
radicals were directly influenced by the Afghan jihad.59 
 
This surge of newly trained Islamic extremists led to a deterioration of Soviet influence in 
Afghanistan and it fueled the concerns of politically frustrated Chechens. Some jihadists 
which fought alongside Afghani mujahedeen made their way to the North Caucasus 
region, bringing with them Islamic extremism and using it to fight their new battle for 
independence in Chechnya. Shamil Basayev and Emir Khattab, two main rebel leaders in 
the Chechen wars against the Soviet Union, participated in CIA sponsored trainings in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.60  
Khattab rushed to Chechnya in the first days of the Russian invasion and created 
the multiethnic guerrilla brigade that fought under explicitly Islamist colors, 
rather than the banner of Chechen nationalism. 61 
 
Yossef Bodansky, director of the U.S. Congress Task Force on Terrorism and 
Unconventional Warfare, noted that: 
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[The involvement of ISI in Chechnya] goes far beyond supplying the Chechens 
with weapons and expertise: the Inter Service Intelligence and its radical Islamic 
proxies are actually calling the shots in this war.62  
 
A 1999 BBC report indicated that Khattab departed from Afghanistan and moved to 
Chechnya with a group of Arab fighters in 1995, possibly sponsored by the Saudi-
Arabian based Islamic Relief Organization.63 Evidently, the Soviet attempt to promote 
and uphold the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and Washington’s funding of 
opposing forces in response, prompted the overwhelming assembly of jihadists. The 
Islamic extremists, given the proper training and funding, were able to further expand 
their numbers and extend their reach to Chechnya where Chechen Muslims, a Russian 
minority, struggled for liberation from Russian rule. Consequently, Russia’s leading 
terrorist insurgency has come from Chechnya. It is a hot bed of all Russian security 
concerns – separatism, ethnic conflict, and international terrorism – that provides an 
opportunity for domestic and foreign forces to cause instability in Russia. Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anatoly Safonov, noted in an interview in 2004, with the 
Italian Newspaper L'Opinione delle Liberta on Terrorism-Related Problems, that 
Chechen terrorists have an aim “to create a caliphate from the Black Sea to the Caspian 
Sea” and in doing so, to take away number of Russian republics and regions.64  
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FIGURE 1 
Image Credit: BBC News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12274023; January, 2011. 
 
 The Chechen Revolution began in 1991 right at the collapse of the USSR, as 
Gorbachev’s perestroika reform allowed great political freedom and expression.65  
Chechnya was ‘radicalized’ during 1993-1994 “in increasingly violent factional 
clashes.”66  
The Chechen revolution changed its ideology from the original predominantly 
secular anti-imperialism with strong undertones of socialism and 
developmentalism to an Islamic radicalism of anti-Western and loosely anarchist 
tone.67 
 
The dissatisfaction of some Chechens with the new peace agreement with Russia in the 
aftermath of the First Chechen War, initiated a number of violent terrorist acts, and the 
problems in Chechnya spilled over to other parts of Russia. Chechen rebels employed a 
number of different terroristic acts, including kidnapping tactics. In May 1998, Yeltsin’s 
personal representative in Chechnya was kidnapped and held for six months. Later in the 	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year, four engineers from Britain and New Zealand were kidnapped and murdered. And 
in March 1999, General Gennadiy Shpigun, Moscow’s top envoy to Chechnya was 
kidnapped from the airport in Grozny and his corpse was later found in Chechnya.68 
Suicide bomb attacks portrayed another technique of terror. Attacks on Russian military 
housing and on apartment buildings took place in Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk: A 
second Chechen War erupted. 69, 70, 71 
The second Chechen War was led by two previously mentioned Islamists: 
Basayev and Khattab. In 1995, Basayev forced the Russian authorities to negotiate with 
the Chechen rebels when he attacked the city of Budionnovsk and occupied a hospital 
with nearly 1600 hostages.72 Khattab, on the other hand, together with his armed unit, 
humiliated Russia when he ambushed and massacred a Russian armored regiment in 
1996.73 Going into the Second Chechen War, Putin said, “We will pursue the terrorists 
everywhere. You will forgive me, but if we catch them in the toilet, we will rub them out 
in the outhouse.”74 This has been a policy to which Putin has remained loyal to this day. 
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Nevertheless, bomb attacks on Russia reached a halt as the Second Chechen War 
began, until when some 50 Chechen terrorists seized the Dubrokvka Theater in 2002, 
holding about 800 innocent civilians hostage. The incident resulted in over 120 
casualties. 75 Since then, the bombing campaign has resumed and resulted in a number of 
deaths of Russian civilians.  
[Later on, in December 2002] Russian government offices in Grozny were 
attacked by a suicide bomber [where] 80 people were killed. [The following year,] 
in 2003, another 50 people were killed in another suicide bombing of a Russian 
government building in the north of the republic… In August of 2004, two 
passenger airliners were brought down by Chechen women suicide bombers, [and 
in addition], there were a series of subway bombings.76 
 
The Beslan tragedy, also know as “Russia’s September 11,” was a siege of an elementary 
school in the Russian region of North Ossetia. Chechen rebels, who are believed to have 
ties with al Qaeda, seized 1,100 hostages.77 The siege lasted three days from September 
1st to September 3rd in 2004. The end results were tragic as over 350 people died, most of 
whom where children; and nearly 800 people were severely injured.78 It is known that 
Shamil Basayev was the mastermind behind the attack.79 President Putin, in his address 
to the nation regarding the tragic upheaval, remarked that: 
We are dealing here not just with separate actions aimed at frightening us, not just 
with separate terrorist sorties. We are dealing with direct intervention of 
international terrorism against Russia, with a total, cruel and full-scale war in 
which our compatriots die again and again.80 
 
Russian leaders have taken great measures to connect with the international 
community in counterterrorism operations; hence, Russia has improved its collaboration 	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with the United States. Russia believes that terrorism is an international issue and the best 
way of handling such a problem is with the guidelines of international law. Andrey 
Denisov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, at the 11th Conference 
of Security and Defense, in Berlin, stated that: 
Today we are witnessing increasing uncertainty in the field of security all over the 
world. In the face of turbulence and lack of predictability and stability, strict 
compliance with international law is the only safety net. Rule of law is of the same 
importance in international relations as it is in internal affairs.81 
 
Consequently, Russia has taken a number of initiatives at home and abroad toward 
developing a counterterrorism action plan. In 1999, Resolution 1269 was passed in the 
UN as a strategic basis for counterterrorism. First Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav 
Trubnikov believes the resolution was mainly a result of Russia’s initiative.82 Also, the 
United Nations Security Council has passed a number of resolutions since the September 
11 attacks on the U.S., which Russia has fully supported. These resolutions include: 
“1368, 1373, 1377 (2001), 1438, 1440, 1450, 1452 (2002), 1455, 1465, 1516 (2003), 
which are all concerned with various aspects of the struggle against international 
terrorism.”83 Russia has also made an effort in counterterrorism through collaboration 
with the G8, NATO, EU, OSCE, SCO and the Council of Europe.84 The developments in 
Chechnya led the Russian government to adopt new domestic laws as well. The Federal 
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Law “On Combating Terrorism” in 1998 has served as the primary foundation of Russian 
counterterrorism efforts.85 
“The law attempted to define terrorist activity omitting political motivation as 
one of the defining characteristics of the crime. It also sketched out the legal 
regime of the counterterrorist operation, and defined organizational 
basis of counterterrorism, placing Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), and 
the Ministry of Interior (MVD) at the top of the list of agencies responsible for 
combating terrorism.” 86 
 
As Russia plunged into the second Chechen struggle, which was followed by another 
wave of violence and terrorist attacks, President Putin’s primary goal was to restore 
Russia’s authority in the North Caucasus region and to stabilize the volatile Southern 
region.87 The first steps taken toward this goal included the re-assertion of “vertical-
power” along with the Kremlin’s efforts to expand control over the mass media.88 
Subsequently, the Russian government revised the first Federal Law On Combating 
Terrorism and in 2006 replaced the 1998 version with a new Federal Law On 
Counteraction to Terrorism.89  “The law legalizes the application of armed forces for 
counterterrorism operations inside and outside of the country, but provides only scant 
description of prophylactic measures aimed at defending the Russian people and 
infrastructure against the threat of terrorism.” 90 Similar to the 1998 act "On 
Combating Terrorism," the 2006 counterterrorism law:  
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Allows for suspension of certain individual liberties and media freedoms in the 
zone of counterterrorist operations, and authorizes counterterrorism units to carry 
out searches and demolition of suspicious airplanes and ships.” 91 
 
 Bordering 14 other nations, with land and coastal boundaries totaling 35,974 
miles, Russia’s national security poses a challenge.92 Afghanistan’s proximity to the rest 
of the Central Asian countries that border Russia remains a large concern to the Russian 
authorities. Afghanistan’s northern border is directly connected to Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China (Figure 2), all of which offer opportunities for Islamist 
extremists.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source :http://mapsof.net/uploads/static-maps/Map_of_Central_Asia.png 
 
While it was in power, the Taliban offered training camps to Chechen rebels 
and encouraged Islamic militants in Central Asia. Many militants left Central 
Asia to fight alongside the Taliban against NATO. Now, however, they are 
filtering back. According to Ahmed Rashid, a leading Pakistan based expert on 
Afghanistan and Central Asia, “They have done enough fighting for other 	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people. They want to fight for their own country… They are trying to infiltrate 
weapons, ammunition and men back into Central Asia.”93 
 
Organizations like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is attempting to 
overthrow the Uzbek President, Islam Karimov, and Imomali Rakhmon, the Tajik leader 
who has supported and led pro-Russians against the Islamists in a 1990’s war, are a 
serious threat to Russia.94 Such movements have helped radical Islam to spread inside 
Russian borders, particularly in the Volga region. The first members of the Islamic 
radical movement Hizb ut-Tahrir made their way to Russia in 1996, most of which were 
of Uzbek and Tajik ethnicities.95 While most of Russia’s fights concentrate in the North 
Caucasus, Central Asia might be even of greater concern. The United States mission in 
Afghanistan is of great value to Russia; hence, the U.S.-Russian cooperation is central in 
impeding the radical movement across Central Asia.  
 
U.S.–RUSSIAN COLLABORATIVE  
COUNTERTERORISM EFFORTS  
 
 
 Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first world leader to call and offer 
assistance to President George Bush after the September 11 attacks on the U.S. World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon. Even prior to 9/11, in 1999, the leaders of the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) agreed that an 
establishment of a joint working group would be of considerable interest to both nations, 
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especially with the issue of national security threats.96 President Putin and the Clinton 
administration decided to take action against terrorism in Afghanistan by way of the 
“U.S.—Russian Working Group on Afghanistan.” At the very first meeting held on 
August 1st and 2nd in 2000, the two countries evaluated the threat posed to regional and 
international stability by Taliban’s backing for terrorism. “They explored bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral options for addressing that threat.”97 The United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1267, adapted in 1999, calling for sanctions against all 
Taliban, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda affiliates, was also reiterated.98 September 11 
increased the counterterrorism bilateral relations between the two nations to 
unprecedented levels. Russia especially welcomed this opportunity as it portrayed itself 
victim of international terrorism long before the 9/11 events. Shortly after the attacks, the 
two countries took a further step toward building an unmatched post Cold War 
partnership. In the October 21, 2001 Joint U.S.-Russia Statement and the latter Joint 
Statement on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia of November 13, 
2001, the two made it clear that an effort would be made to join forces in agreement that 
terrorism represents a crime against all humanity. 
Our countries are embarked on a new relationship for the 21st century, founded 
on a commitment to the values of democracy, the free market, and the rule of law. 
The United States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither 
country regards the other as an enemy or threat. Aware of our responsibility to 
contribute to international security, we are determined to work together, and with 
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other nations and international organizations, including the United Nations, to 
promote security, economic well-being, and a peaceful, prosperous, free world.99 
 
Realizing that the bilateral efforts successfully helped pave the way for a new 
governmental installment led by Hamid Karzai, in Afghanistan, though the U.N. Bonn 
Agreement,100 the two sides decided to remodel the “U.S.—Russian Working Group on 
Afghanistan” to encompass issues broader than Afghanistan. In 2002, Putin and Bush 
advanced the working group to The U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism. 
The new agenda embodied possibilities of combating terrorism on additional levels. For 
the first time, concepts of nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism found its place in the 
consensual plan.101  
 The Russian Academy of Sciences, in cooperation with the NAS, came up with 
six different work groups in counterterrorist efforts. These categories furthered the scope 
of terrorism threats and served as the groundwork for the bilateral effort in countering 
security risks for the years to come. But, intelligence sharing and yearly meetings defined 
the extent of collaborative efforts. Series of events from 2002-2008 interfered with the 
progress of bilateral ties: The 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 	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Treaty102 signed by the two powers in 1972; the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was 
strongly opposed by Moscow; the U.S.-Russian disagreement over the independence of 
Kosovo; the American initiative to build an anti-ballistic missile defense system in 
Poland, which very much troubled Moscow; and finally the Russo-Georgian War in 
2008, all put a strain on the U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations, affecting 
collaboration in all dimensions. However at the 2009 G20 Summit, then newly elected 
U.S. President Obama and Dmitry Medvedev struck a friendly note when they announced 
the “reset” of the U.S.–Russian relations. This reset essentially led to a visit to Moscow, 
where the establishment of the U.S.–Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission under the 
initiative of President Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev was announced on July 6, 
2009. The intent was to broaden the collective action on the world stage, and today the 
commission identifies eighteen different areas of mutual interest and cooperation, one of 
which is counterterrorism. Since the enactment, the bilateral partnership has once again 
surpassed its record of unprecedented reciprocation. On the very same day of the initial 
statement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Undersecretary of State William 
Burns concluded an agreement (U.S.–Russia Military Transit Agreement) that enables the 
United States to use Russian territory for transport of American military personnel and 
non-military equipment to its personnel in Afghanistan.103 The new routes decrease the 
amount of time it takes for the necessary support to reach the U.S. and its coalition bases 
in Afghanistan. Russia does not demand any air navigation charges for the agreement that 
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permits 4,500 flights per year and that will save the United States government up to $133 
million annually in fuel, maintenance and other transferal costs.104  
By providing access to these transit routes, the Russian Federation is enabling a 
substantial increase in the efficiency of our common effort to defeat the forces of 
violent extremism in Afghanistan and to ensure Afghanistan’s and the broader 
region’s security.105 
 
 With the ‘reset’ of relations, Russia has more and more involved herself in 
Afghanistan, surpassing the initial agreement to only provide support by alleviating 
transportation costs and difficulties. The Russians have not only provided intelligence 
and transportation routes but also their own personnel. For the first time ever, Russia 
and the United States conducted a joint military mission in Afghanistan. The reset 
relations between the two sides have proven to increase the amount of cooperation 
substantially, especially in Afghanistan.  
 Afghanistan 
 
 
 The former Soviet Union’s experience in Afghanistan serves as a very valuable 
asset in U.S.-Russian efforts. A group of former Soviet Union diplomats, ambassadors 
and generals voiced their opinions at an American-Russian conference in 2009 and 
warned that ignoring a decade of experience there would be a mistake. The retired 
officials did not refer to Afghanistan as a real centralized state, but as an aggregation of 
various ethnic groups ruled by different tribal policies. “There is no such nation as 
Afghanistan,” said Ruslan Aushey, a former S.U. Lieutenant General.106 Hence, peace 
will not be brought with an escalation of troops, spoke the former Soviet ambassador to 	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Afghanistan, Fikryat Tabeyev, from experience, as he witnessed a rise of over 100,000 
Soviet troops in Afghanistan without any prospect of victory.  
Many challenges that bedeviled the Soviets confront the American operation 
today. Among them are vicious tribal rivalries, a weak central government, radical 
Islamists, power-hungry warlords, incompetent or corrupt local military 
commanders, failing infrastructure and the complexity of fighting guerrilla 
groups…Trying to bring democracy to Afghanistan, or anything resembling it, 
will be as fruitless as [the Soviet] attempts to install communism.107 
 
Instead, in their efforts to help the United States, the former officials advise the U.S. and 
Russia to invest in infrastructure, to bring doctors, educators, engineers and soldiers to 
guard irrigation systems and roads, rather than escalating the number of troops that are 
fighting village wars with no plausible victories. The core of the problem rests in the 
understanding that “[the economic sphere of Afghanistan] is now at a stage lower than 
the Middle Ages,” commented Pavel Grachev, a retired General. “Healthcare and 
education levels are among the worst in the world,” Grachev continues, “there are no jobs 
other than tending poppy fields.” After Kabul, which houses about 3.3 million people in 
its urban sphere, the second largest city, Kandahar, holds a population of only 498,000. 
This means that most of Afghanistan’s 31 million residents are dispersed across the rural 
outskirts of the country, living in small villages, alienated by the lack of transportation 
and road infrastructure.108,109  
As a result, any occupation force will spend much of its time propping up a 
government that has little relevance outside Kabul and trying to corral disparate 
ethnic groups and tribes into a national army that's often unwilling to fight.110 	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Consequently, much of the U.S.-Russian efforts in Afghanistan have concentrated on 
weakening the drug trade, building infrastructure and providing military training to 
Afghan forces. 
Drug Eradication 
 
 
 Afghanistan today produces 90% of the world’s opium, most of which is sold as 
heroin in Europe and Russia. There are approximately 300-500 laboratories producing 
about 380-400 tons of heroin per year.111 Illegal drug trade profits uphold terrorism and 
its activities that threaten the security of both the U.S. and Russia. Also, Russia claims 
opium production and export of Afghanistan’s drugs a top national security threat as 
heroin smuggling across its borders accounts for the upsurge of drug related crimes and 
130,000 annual deaths.112, 113 Hence, diminishing drug production and its trade in 
Afghanistan is one of the top priorities on the U.S.-Russian joint to do list. “Terrorism 
and narcotics are two elements that cannot be separated from each other and Afghans 
lives' have also been seriously affected by those two elements.”114 During the 1980s, 
mujahedeen operating out of Pakistan relied on the cultivation and sales of opium 
poppy—used in production of opium and heroin—to attain weapons used in fighting 
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. After the Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, the 
U.S. no longer needed to fund the mujahedeen; hence opium became a vital channel to 	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income and weapons against the communistic government. Juan Carlos, a former U.S. 
National Security Council adviser on terrorism argues that “narco dollars are a major, if 
not majority of [Taliban’s] funding sources” today, making up 85-90% ($80 to $100 
millions of dollars)115 of the Taliban’s revenue, estimates John Solomon, a U.S. Military 
Academy's terrorism expert.116  This seems ironic considering the Taliban imposed ban on 
poppy cultivation (but not on its export) in 1999, arguing that it opposed Islamic beliefs. 
The Taliban charges the producers’ movement of drugs throughout its territory, and it has 
also been known to impose fraudulent tolls, taxes and even zakat, one of the five pillars 
of Islam requiring charity donation. Both terrorist organizations and organized crime 
groups have been known to use an informal money transfer system, hawala. After 9/11, 
bin Laden’s most gainful funding sources were terminated. However, al Qaeda has since 
reconstructed its money trail through the hawala system, often relying on Taliban’s illicit 
narco profits.117 
 The major problems for the Afghani government include the fact that a large 
portion of its GDP comes from drug sales (15% in 2012), that most of its population lives 
in poverty and that it cannot financially compete with the Taliban. The average Taliban 
soldiers are paid $100 a month, which is about $20 more than the policemen receive. 
Considering the low price of local explosives, this money can go a long way.118 United 
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Nations Office of Drug and Crime argues in The Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008 that 
opium cultivation in Afghanistan is now closely linked with al Qaeda.  
Indeed, 98% of all of Afghanistan’s opium is grown in just seven provinces in the 
south-west (Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Farah, Nimroz, and to a lesser extent 
Daykundi and Zabul), where there are permanent Taliban settlements, and where 
organized crime groups profit from the instability. This geographical overlap 
between regions of opium and zones of insurgency shows the inextricable link 
between drugs and conflict. Since drugs and insurgency are caused by, and affect, 
each other, they need to be dealt with at the same time – and urgently.119 
 
Various efforts have been made to help eradicate the drug problem in Afghanistan, 
one of which is an effort to educate the population and opium poppy farmers through 
drug awareness campaigns. 
Drug Awareness Campaigns 
 
 
 Since 1995, with an exception of the 2001 Taliban ban, the production of opium 
in Afghanistan has been on the rise (Figure 3), and with favorable weather conditions 
amounted to 93% of world’s production in 2007. Two factors have been identifies as the 
causes for the 19% cultivation decrease in 2008: One, drought; and two, good leadership 
by province governors and religious leaders who campaigned against opium and 
encouraged farmers to grow alternative crops.120 
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  The leadership successes can be attributed to the western alliance’s installment of new 
government heads. The awareness campaigns, however, have a positive correlation with 
the reduction of poppy cultivation (Figure 4). According to the Afghanistan Opium 
Survey 2012: Opium Risk Assessment for All Regions: 
Those villages, which had been covered by the campaign, were less likely to grow 
poppy than those which had not been reached by the campaign. This association 
was significant. Thus, the awareness campaign seems to have had a positive 
influence on the decision not to grow opium.121 
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 Other efforts to reduce the production of opium target supply and demand. The 
U.S.-Russia Counternarcotics Working Group aims at diminishing both the request for 
and production of drugs. 
U.S. – Russia Counternarcotics Working Group: 
 
 
 The group was chartered during the 2009 meeting between President Medvedev 
and President Obama, amidst the development of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential 
Commission. The creation of the Working Group established an operational cooperation 
between Federal Drug Control Services of Russia (FSKN)122 and the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) on measures directed at reducing narcotic 
laboratories in Afghanistan and quenching the illicit activities of Afghan narcotics 
trafficking networks.123 The group established a number of sub-groups, which aim at 
accomplishing three goals: supply reduction, demand reduction and establishing legal 
framework for counternarcotics efforts. For instance ‘sub-group “A”’ is to concentrate on 
illicit finances related to Afghan narcotics trafficking. ‘Sub-group “B” is delegated with 
the task of exchanging U.S.–Russian intelligence and experience, thus using the 
information to collaboratively enhance drug prevention and abuse while finding the best 
ways to provide assistance to those with drug dependency. Furthermore, ‘sub-group “C” 
strictly involved close cooperation between the U.S. DEA and FSKN on countering 
narcotics trafficking.124 In a press conference after the fourth Russia–U.S. Working 
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Group meeting, the Director of National Drug Control Policy, Gil Kerlikowske, 
remarked: 
Our joint efforts to reduce drug use and its consequences mark an era of 
unprecedented counterdrug cooperation and engagement with Russia. Already, 
our historic joint law enforcement actions have helped to strengthen public safety 
by disrupting illicit drug trafficking networks. Today’s work to share information 
and strategies to prevent drug use and expand treatment demonstrates our 
countries’ commitment to saving lives and protecting public health by reducing 
the demand for drugs among our citizens.125   
 
Ivanov and Kerlikowske further note that the United States and Russia have taken 
numerous initiatives to increase collaboration since the enactment of the U.S.–Russia 
Bilateral Presidential Commission. The two powers have engaged in a number of 
different joint training activities, and in 2010 they jointly acted on two major enforcement 
operations. In July 2010, the prevention of a substantial cocaine shipment from the 
United States to Russia marked the very first major collaborative victory. The second 
triumph, possible due to combined efforts, resulted in liquidation of four drug 
laboratories in Afghanistan and the confiscation of 932 kg of heroin and 156 kg of opium 
in October of 2010, amounting to $250 million dollars and 200 million heroin doses. The 
Afghan National Security Forces, in collaboration with the U.S. and Russian experts, led 
the operation.126, 127  
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 The Working Group also aspires to integrate regional support and legal 
cooperation in securing drug trafficking routes and stabilizing the region. An important 
partner is the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC) 
especially in regards to the Northern Drug Trafficking Route, which begins in 
Afghanistan and passes through Central Asia and Russia, reaching Western European 
Markets. The Central Asian countries are an important piece of the puzzle as their efforts 
to suppress the flow of narcotics all work toward a similar goal of stabilizing the region 
and preventing terrorism and narcotics from overflowing from Afghanistan into the 
neighboring regions.  
 The Counternarcotics Working Groups has been on the right track in its mission 
to suppress the production, demand and smuggling of opium and heroin in Afghanistan. 
It’s important to understand that its mission goes hand in hand with counterterrorism 
efforts and other joint projects directed at improving the economy, infrastructure and the 
judicial system while diminishing corruption. Ivanov and other Russian officials have 
often criticized the United States for not doing enough to prevent the flow of heroin from 
Afghanistan to Russia. In 2010, Moscow remarked that the Russian intelligence services 
had identified and provided the U.S. officials with geographic coordinates for 175 
different heroin-processing laboratories, but that the United States failed to act. The 
United States is very concerned with consequences of opium eradication. The U.S. 
officials have often argued that vast annihilation of poppy fields could drive farmers into 
the arms of the Taliban, consequently increasing the danger of radicalization and terrorist 
attacks that could ultimately result in further instability in Afghanistan and the 
surrounding regions.  
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 Thus, it is important to bear in mind that while counternarcotic efforts help Russia 
and Europe suppress drug flow through their borders, it is equally, if not more, important 
that drug eradication liquidates funding necessary for terrorist organization to carry out 
operations.  
Country Programme for Afghanistan 2012-2014 
 
 
 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) sponsors the Country 
Programme for Afghanistan (CPA). Both Russia and the United States contribute to 
UNODC financially and are considered top donor league members. The CPA aims to 
strengthen the capacity of the Afghan government and to, therefore, lessen the effects of 
drug and crime in the country.128 UNODC envisions stability and development in 
Afghanistan by enforcing the Criminal Justice system and Counter Narcotics and by 
handing responsibility for implementation to the head of the Kabul office, run by the 
local government. The Programme recognizes the complexity of Afghanistan’s illicit 
drug production, which closely intertwines with issues of weak governance, corruption 
and low standards of living, health and security.129 With such recognitions, the goal is to 
first identify all variables of the drug and crime problem, and second to use an integrated 
approach that entails four sub-programmes: 130   
 1. Research, Policy and Advocacy: This branch of the program strives to enhance 
the capacity of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Counter Narcotics by encouraging research, 
inter-agency cooperation, closer crop monitoring and further provincial outreach.  
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 2. Law Enforcement: Aims to strengthen the capacity of Counter Narcotics Police 
and other national partners working toward the goal of diminishing drug influence. The 
strategy is to provide mentoring and training on specific curricula by using different 
methods of regulating, such as intelligence-led policing and the use of forensics for better 
drug control and crime prevention.  
 3. Criminal Justice: The focus of the branch it to establish a professional judicial 
culture; one that will redefine Afghanistan’s current judicial system to incorporate 
important lawful and just practices, taking into consideration integrity, impunity, prison 
reform, anti-corruption and inserting juvenile legal distinctions and justice. Such legal 
measures would provide the foundation for peace and stability in Afghanistan and will 
enable a fair and an effective way to address narcotics and trafficking. The legal system 
in Afghanistan lacks infrastructure, professional staffing, independence from the 
executive branch of the government and moreover, it’s infected with corruption.131 In a 
2010 UNODC corruption survey, 25% of respondent “had to pay a bribe to a police 
officers [in 2010], 18% had to bribe a judge, and 13% a prosecutor.”132 
 4. Health and Livelihood:  Focuses on two groups of the population: One, those 
reliant on poppy cultivation for income and livelihood, and two, those affected by drug 
use and dependence. The goal is to reduce the amount of poppy farmers by offering 
alternative options for income and survival to people who make a living planting poppies 
by providing alternative crops and possibly different skillset trainings. The second 
objective is to diminish drug addition by providing assistance to addicts and or victims in 
need. 	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 Whether the CPA has had a significant impact is hard to tell. Figures 5 and 6, 
separated by regions, show the reasons why farmers did not cultivate poppies so far in 
2013 compared to 2012. It is important to bear in mind that recent efforts in Afghanistan 
have concentrated in the southern, eastern, southwestern and central provinces. These 
regions are, to this day, under a heavy Taliban presence, and poppy cultivation, much of 
the time, results from the high Taliban demand. This could explain why “fear of 
eradication” has spiked by 44% in 2013 in these particular regions. Only 11% of farmers 
did not cultivate due to environmental or natural factors such as the lack of water, plant 
disease or not enough yield, because of the natural causes. The remainder of cultivators 
feared eradication more than the fact that there is a ban by the government, a 29% 
decrease from 2012. The fact that Islam and the decisions of elders and shura133 made a 
difference could mean that the awareness campaigns and the involvement of local 
religious leaders worked to an extent.  
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 On the other hand, when comparing the southern regions to those of the northern 
and northeastern Afghanistan, farmers’ attitudes change. The fear of eradication 
decreased by 27% from the prior year. A possible explanation could be, again, because 
governmental efforts have shifted to southern territories of Afghanistan, the northern 
regions have not been as affected by the CPA. However, more farmers are complying 
with the government, an 18% increase from 2012. Contrastingly, the northern regions are 
more affected by the environmental factors, 46% noted that there was either not enough 
yield or that there was a lack of water. This 46% of the farmers would most likely still 
cultivate poppies, had the environment permitted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Considering that there are over 5 million heroin addicts in Russia, Moscow has 
promised support to the U.S. and NATO’s drug eradication effort in Afghanistan. In 
2010, the Russian Interior Ministry has provided necessary training to over 200 Afghan 
FIGURE	  6	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police officers.134 Nevertheless, higher prices of opium in 2012 encouraged a rise in 
cultivation of poppy crops, from 131,000 hectares in 2011 to 150,000 hectares in 2012, 
an 18% increase. However, due to bad weather and plant disease that damaged the crop, 
the overall production of opium fell by 36% from 5,800 to 3,700 tons.135 Cultivation 
figures are more important when measuring progress, since cultivation shows the initial 
intent of the farmers to produce opium. Therefore, it is clear that the U.S.–Russian and 
NATO efforts to eradicate the drug problem have not been very successful thus far. 
Figure 7 portrays reasons why farmers cultivated poppies in 2013.   
 
 
 It is evident that economic prospects from highly priced opium serve as the 
foremost motivating factors for poppy cultivation. The efforts to eradicate the cultivation 
and production of opium can only go to limited measures, because Afghans don’t have 
alternative work and income opportunities to provide for basic survival needs. Five 
percent or 191,000 households of Afghanistan’s population rely on the narcotic 	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industry.136 However, it is not only the opium poppy farmers who drive the drug 
business, but among the permitting factors are also smugglers who encourage the 
farmers, poverty, corruption and lawlessness. 
 In an interview, U.S. Corporal Gregory Kilcommons, A Company, 1st Battalion, 
25th Marines, deployed to FOB Alamo on the outskirts of Kabul Province, July 2011 to 
February 2012, served as an assistant team leader on Afghan National Army training 
team, as well as on the convoy personal security detachment. He does not believe the 
eradication campaign has worked thus far: 
In my view, [the eradication campaign has] not been extremely successful, and 
that essentially is due to the consequences.  With fertile land hard to come by, the 
ease of cultivating poppy, and the reward of cultivating poppy is high in terms of 
money, farmers in Afghanistan, whether affiliated with terrorism or not, have 
incredible incentive to grow poppy.  Each growing season ISAF used to go 
around and burn the poppies harvests, either reimbursing the farmer or 
occasionally assisting the farmer with growing other crops.  When this began to 
have a negative backlash in public opinion (…go figure…), the Afghan National 
Security Forces took up that roll, which then only helped ostracize the populace 
even further.  Either way, whether they are ill spirited or not, Afghan’s will do 
whatever it takes to make a living. We must provide incentive to grow other 
crops, rather than simply burning or cutting down a farmer’s livelihood.137 
 
On a similar note, Lieutenant Sean Parnell who led his unit, the “Outlaw Platoon” against 
the Taliban along Pakistan border from 2006 to 2007, describes the constant struggle of 
the U.S. and NATO forces’ to help the Afghani people when the Taliban punishes them 
for accepting foreign aid. This dichotomy between the people’s need for help and their 
fear of consequences by the Taliban makes it very difficult to reach out to the public and 
fight the insurgency.138  
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 Strengthening border control whilst diminishing corruption is as equally 
important as making an effort to influence farmers’ decisions to grow opium. 
Landlocked, Afghanistan is reachable only by air and land, meaning that the very porous 
borders are difficult to patrol. Most of Afghanistan’s heroin passes through Pakistan (160 
metric tons), Iran (115 metric tons) and Central Asia (90 metric tons) before reaching 
Russian, European, East and South Asian markets.139 On the other hand, an estimated 
1,000 mt of chemicals, essential for conversion of opium into heroin, are illegally 
imported into Afghanistan every year. Thus far, Afghan forces organized the most 
successful operations, seizing 23 mt of such chemicals in 2011.140 Also in 2011, Counter 
Narcotics Police of Afghanistan conducted 1,807 operations, resulting in seizures of 53 
mt of opium, 33 mt of heroin, 58 mt of hashish, 29 mt of morphine and 112mt of 
precursor chemicals.  
 Despite the U.S. Russian Cooperation, some officials such as the Head of 
Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service, Viktor Ivanov, believe that the U.S. and NATO 
presence in Afghanistan has contributed to the drug problem. Ivanov proclaimed on Ekho 
Moskvy, a Russian radio station, that he “is convinced that the flow of (Afghan) drugs to 
Russia will decrease as soon as Americans withdraw from Afghanistan." He argues that 
Afghanistan’s drug production skyrocketed with the U.S.-NATO invasion.141 Such 
outlook makes sense when considering the fact that the Taliban needed to increase its 
illicit profits to defend itself against the invading troops. On the other hand, Uzbekistan’s 
President Islam Karimov has a very different assessment of the situation: 	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We have serious concerns that there will be an upsurge in terrorist and extremist 
activities, and the volume and scope of drug trafficking will grow following the 
forces' departure. In my opinion, one can hardly reject such a possibility. 
Secondly, these terrorist and extremist activities themselves will not be able to 
remain confined within the Afghan borders. They will spill over into other 
countries. A strong army should be formed in Afghanistan and other important 
problems facing this country should be resolved before the international forces 
leave it.142 
The strategy has been to build the capacity of the Afghan army, so when the U.S. and 
NATO troops begin their withdrawal, Afghanistan will be able to maintain its progress 
and secure its future. 
Securing the Future 
 
 An important aspect of the U.S.–Russian vision in Afghanistan is to build the 
capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the Afghan Local Police 
(ALP), which is mostly village focused where ANSF numbers are limited, and of the 
supplementary counternarcotics regulators. Thus, all will be responsible for securing 
Afghanistan once international forces depart in 2014. The international community is 
concerned that once outside support disperses that Afghanistan will not be able to retain 
control and stability of the country on its own. Therefore, the NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), established in 2001 by the United Nations Security 
Council; Russia; the U.S.; and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA); have all lent a hand in trying to build a strong, self-sufficient national Afghan 
government and forces that will be able to maintain the socio-economic development and 
further improvements in national government necessary for a progressive and peaceful 
future of Afghanistan. The goal is to fully shift responsibility, currently led by ISAF, to 	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Afghan National Security Forces by 2014. NATO reports that transition is well 
underway, as ANSF currently maintains security of 87% of Afghan’s population.143 
ISAF’s initial purpose was to lead and train Afghan National Security Forces and other 
policing governmental personnel, however, its duties over the years have expanded to 
combating the insurgency and protecting civilians throughout Afghanistan, whilst 
ensuring security necessary for infrastructure efforts.144 The transition of leadership to 
Afghan local forces has thus far been a four-step process, the first tranche beginning in 
March 2011, the second in November 2011, the third in May 2012 and the fourth, or the 
current one, was announced by President Karzai on December, 31 2012. The Russia-
NATO council has also greatly contributed to developing visions, goals and actions taken 
in Afghanistan. At a press conference following a NATO-Russia Council meeting, 
NATO Secretary General, Andres Fogh Rasmussen, announced that Russia and NATO 
have been closely working together in counter-terrorism efforts and will be increasing 
their cooperation in 2013. 
This year we will also take further steps in our counter- terrorism projects.  In 
June, we will be testing for the first time a technology we developed jointly to 
detect explosives in crowded places.  The test will be held in a metro station in a 
European capital.  And in September, the NATO-Russia joint air traffic system 
will conduct a live exercise to defend against terrorist threats to civilian 
aircraft.145 
 The latest ISAF figures indicate (as of April 22, 2013) that there are currently 	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99,590 ISAF forces contributed by fifty, NATO led nations and 187,000 ANSF trained 
troops in Afghanistan.146 In 2002 ANSF was more of an infantry force, but today it has 
evolved to be a “fully-fledged army to comprise both fighting elements and enabling 
capabilities – such as military police, intelligence, route clearance, combat support, 
medical, aviation and logistics.”147  While some reports and statistics, such as the ISAF 
Monthly Data Trends in 2012,148 show a reduction of Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIA) to 
be 4% lower in 2012 in comparison to the prior year, one should not ignore the fact that 
the overall amount of EIAs has increased since 2009, but decreased since 2010. The 
increase can be explained by the Obama administration’s ‘surge’ of 30,000 soldiers to 
Afghanistan in November of 2009, possibly meaning that troops invoke more attacks and 
violence. The number of attacks on ANSF and ISAF usually increase during the poppy 
harvest and opium production season, which begins in April and lasts until August. Also 
of importance is the number of civilian casualties caused by the ISAF, which has 
decreased by 62% in 2012, in comparison to 2011 (Figure 8). This is significant because 
it shows that ISAF and ANSF collaboration and training is heading in a positive 
direction.149 Nevertheless, it is evident that the number of attacks has overall increased 
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over the years, and while ISAF has been successful in expanding the capacity of the 
ANSF and ALP, the coalition forces have not been successful in reducing the overall 
amount of violence (Figure 8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. Corporal Gregory Kilcommons believes that ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan has not 
been very successful: 
ISAF, anchored by US forces, has been successful in routing terrorists from 
Afghanistan, bringing schools/medicine/infrastructure to the nation, and trained a 
force of over 300,000 Afghan security forces.  However, I believe this stability is 
artificial and will not last.  Sure, ISAF has pushed the area of operation of the 
Taliban to the southern perimeter of the country, but has only created a newer, 
possibly stronger Taliban in Pakistan’s FATA region.  Sure ISAF has trained 
300,000 Afghan security forces, but what is the quality of these troops and will 
the unstandardized training regimen provided by ISAF forces result in a effective 
combat force?  In my experience, ISAF slowed down the operation.  While in 
theory an international effort is appealing due to cooperation and the sharing of 
FIGURE	  8	  
	  	  
	   	   54	  
ideas, resources, and diplomatic strength, the reality of an international effort runs 
the risk of being bogged down by bureaucracy, unequal efforts, and confusion; 
which I believe happened in Afghanistan.  Essentially, ISAF has indirectly put 
Afghanistan in a position for a massive security/stability vacuum to occur, most 
likely to be filled by the Taliban as they flow through Pakistan’s porous border.150 
 As important it is for ANSF and ALP to be self-sufficient and to protect its 
civilians from terrorism and narcotics it is also vital for Afghanistan to obtain a stable 
economy and to provide its population with alternatives to opium cultivation and 
production. One way to achieve this would be to invest in infrastructure. 
Building Infrastructure: 
 While efforts to fight the cultivation and production of opium in Afghanistan 
remain a priority to Russia, Moscow has developed a concern that combating narcotics 
along with the opium producers and smugglers is not enough. Taking the advice from 
former Russian generals, ambassadors and diplomats, who experienced Afghanistan in 
the 1980s, the Russian and the U.S. governments decided to assist in infrastructure 
enhancements. Afghanistan’s northern regions are rich with natural gas and minerals, 
something Moscow knew even during its 1980s invasion. The plan to help, therefore, 
would not be only beneficial to Afghanistan, but also to Moscow as its companies would 
be actively involved in energy projects. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India 
Pipeline (TAPI) proposed in mid 1990s has undergone many debates and interruptions, 
especially during the war in Afghanistan, until 2011 when the talks on progress resumed. 
European and American interests in the pipeline have evoked a response from Moscow, 
which now wants to invest in the project and offer a possible contract with Gazprom.151 	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TAPI would increase Afghanistan’s GDP, which would then hopefully be utilized to 
support the counternarcotic and counterterrorism forces.  
Mounting Russian concerns that Islamist militancy and cheap drugs emanating 
from Afghanistan are a threat to its national security have made Moscow refocus 
on the region even as the U.S. and its NATO allies maneuver to draw down. Two 
decades after the Soviet army left Afghanistan in humiliating defeat, Russia is 
poised to spend billions in the war-wracked country to develop infrastructure, 
mineral and energy reserves, with new plans taking shape to boost military 
capability. This time around, it has America's blessing. Large-scale investment 
may also enter Afghanistan to help shore up the embattled Karzai regime — and 
to make money.152 
 
 Russia is also making an effort to upgrade a number of Soviet-era installations, 
one of which is a $500 million plan to rebuild a number of hydroelectric-power plants.153 
Among the numerous projects in which Moscow plans to invest is the construction of 
wells and irrigation systems in Afghanistan’s countryside. Nevertheless, her ambitions 
extend to pursuing benefits from Afghanistan’s natural resources and minerals, such as 
natural gas, iron and aluminum, announced Motlagh, a Time Magazine reporter.154 
Russia has also been involved in a number of house-building projects and has built a 
cement factory at Jabal Seraj.155  
 Likewise, the Obama administration has also reshaped its approach to 
counterterrorism in Afghanistan by shifting its focus from drug eradication to institution 
building and creating alternatives for opium poppy farmers. Both Moscow and Tashkent 
stand behind the new U.S. plan. Islam Karimov remarked that further militarization of 
Afghanistan will not solve long-term problems. Meanwhile Moscow agrees, it aims to 	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find alternative means to eradicate both narcotics and terrorism, whose main sources it 
believes stem from Afghanistan and low standards of living in the country.156 President 
Obama’s strategy, very much relies on enhancement of Afghanistan’s regional support 
and reconstruction projects that strive to stabilize the country before the final withdrawal 
of U.S. forces in 2014. Providing the Afghan population with proper health care, 
education and access to basic resources, such as clean water and electricity, would 
encourage the support of Afghanistan’s central government and therefore, increase the 
probability of long-term peace and stability in the region.  
 Thus far, U.S.-Russian aspirations seem to have paid off in various sectors of 
populations’ livelihood. For one, education has reached unprecedented levels. Fifty 
percent of inhabitants are under eighteen-years-old, making Afghanistan have one of the 
largest populations of school children in the world. During the Taliban’s rule, zero 
percent of girls received an education; the percentage increased to 40% today.157 
Furthermore, since 2002, more than 4,000 schools have been built and nearly 200,000 
new educators have been trained. Also, only 900,000 children enrolled in school in 2002, 
whereas today, there are almost 8 million educated children.158 However, Afghanistan’s 
economy and job formation need to keep up with these statistics if real change is to be 
made, if opium farmers are to retire poppy cultivation and if terrorism funding is to be 
abated.  	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Counterterrorism Working Group 
 The U.S.–Russia Counterterrorism Working Group was created within the 
Bilateral Presidential Commission framework. It serves as a platform for the U.S.–
Russian counterterrorism leaders to discuss important national and international security 
threats, to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on relevant law-enforcement matters, to 
find ways of securing and improving transportation security and to encourage 
information and intelligence sharing, among other missions.159 Russian Special 
Presidential Representative for International Cooperation in the Fight against Terrorism, 
Aleksandr Zmeyevskiy, and Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the U.S. Department of 
State, Daniel Benjamin, co-chair the Working Group and lead its efforts. Information 
exchange has been a very important aspect of this relationship. Russian intelligence 
supports the U.S. efforts to fight terrorism in Afghanistan and provides the U.S. forces 
with relevant classified data on a frequent basis. The joint effort in Afghanistan and the 
surrounding region has led to a number of successes, including disruption of money 
laundering operations, freezing terrorists’ financial assets and prevention of overall 
terrorist economic gains.160 National security has been one of the vital focuses, therefore, 
intelligence sharing has taken a step further by integrating the U.S. Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) and the Russian Ministry of Transport, who have 
acknowledged the importance of exchange of techniques and information in order to best 
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secure civil aviation security.161 The two countries have also conducted joint operational 
trainings. For instance, active exercises on countering improvised-explosive devices 
(IED) was held in the United States, while TSA examined and observed heavily 
trafficked Russian airports, suggesting improvements and learning how to better improve 
aviation security in the United States. While the Working Groups proved that 
collaboration between the U.S. and Russia could bring successful outcomes, there is a lot 
of room for improvement. The U.S.–Russian relationship has without a doubt been a 
rocky one, which is often reflected in their counterterrorism efforts. Both countries 
accuse one another of civil right abuses. The Russian administration portrays the U.S. as 
hypocritical, because of its use of targeting drones and counterterrorist actions in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and elsewhere. Also, at times, Russia has been critical of the United States 
for not making stronger opium eradication efforts in Afghanistan.162 
  In the more recent example, the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombings 
presumably perpetrated by two brothers of Chechen origin, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev, U.S.–Russian cooperation is publicized along with its flaws. Tamerlan, the 
older of the two brothers, has been on Russia’s terrorist watch list since 2011. In the case 
of the recent attacks, Moscow shared wiretaps with the United States of Zubeidat 
Tsarnaeva, their mother, presumably revealing conversations about jihad and connections 
to another person on Russia’s suspect list in Chechnya. The Russian authorities warned 
Washington of the possible threat. The question is why has not the United States taken 
the Russian warning seriously?  
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 Members of Congress have questioned the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
decision to close a 2011 inquiry into Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who later became a 
suspect in the bombings. Russian intelligence agencies had told the FBI that he had 
become radical and asked for information about him. The Central Intelligence 
Agency also was provided with the information and alerted other U.S. agencies.163 
 
The U.S. authorities followed up by searching its databases, but no evidence of terrorist 
activity or suspicion was found.  
 The FBI searched U.S. terrorism and crime databases, conducted interviews and 
found nothing incriminating, and the Russians didn’t respond to requests for more 
information, according to U.S. officials who asked not to be identified discussing 
intelligence matters.164 
 
Representative Adam Schiff a member of the House Intelligence Committee, comments 
that Moscow is “careful about disclosing sources just as our own intelligence is, and there 
is a lot of mutual suspicion. So, we will take Russian help as much as they’re willing to 
give.”165  
 It is evident that while there have been areas of cooperation, Russians and 
Americans have a lot more to discuss and to improve areas of intelligence sharing and 
further communication. This example of poor collaboration leading to the Boston 
Bombings, exemplifies the mistrust between the two nations. The fact that Russia warned 
the United States about terrorists with Chechen origins could have been a reason why the 
United States had not taken the threat seriously. However, as the authorities are still 
investigating the nature of the misconnect, it is difficult to conclude exactly why the 
Russian warning was not enough to prevent the Boston tragedy.  
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 Nevertheless, while some aspects of the eradication campaign have shown to have 
some positive influence, the overall effort has not been very successful thus far. The 
figures prove that reliance of farmers on cultivation is on the rise. Until Afghanistan’s 
economy has the ability to provide its people with alternative, stable jobs, the cultivation 
and production of the opium poppy are not very likely to cease. The efforts should be 
directed more toward investing in infrastructure and educating the people, especially the 
younger generations who make up almost half of the population. Such initiatives have 
worked thus far, improving peoples’ livelihoods. On the other hand, while providing the 
Afghan security forces with proper training is a significant aspect in moving the country 
forward, U.S., Russia and their allies need to be wary of the newly created Taliban 
presence in Pakistan. Efforts to reform governmental institutions, especially judicial and 
legal branches have been an important focus of the international community and one that 
should be reiterated. However, vast corruption among governmental officials has proven 
to be a challenge, making it hard to successfully transform institutions vital for long term 
peace and stability in the region. Nevertheless, Afghanistan is not the only issue that the 
two powers need to worry about. The threat of nuclear terrorism is a grave concern that 
should not be ignored, and U.S. and Russia have already taken serious steps to eliminate 
such possibility. 
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DIMINISHING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
 The United States and Russia collectively hold 95% of the worlds’ nuclear 
weapons, hence, cooperation between the two countries is vital to implementing 
preventive measures and reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism.166 A number of 
collaborative actions have been taken toward diminishing this threat that poses foremost 
concerns to their national securities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
thinking that a nuclear threat would create new dangers as former S.U. states inherited 
some of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the United States and Russia took the initiative to 
create the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program under the leadership of Senator 
Richard Lugar and Senator Sam Nunn.167 The program aimed to secure and dismantle 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their infrastructure in the former USSR 
regions. Even with the turn of the 21st century, Russia’s stockpile of nuclear weapons 
posed a great concern. The hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) scattered 
across a vast amount of land, guarded by poorly paid soldiers, worried President George 
Bush as terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and even terrorists in Chechnya expressed 
their longing for weapons of mass destruction.168 Since the two-decade long effort to 
work together, the United States has offered funding and expertise in helping Russia to 
eliminate nuclear threats and succeeded in dismantling 7,600 nuclear weapons, 
destroying 2, 300 missiles and securing 24 storage sites, while eliminating all nuclear 
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materials and weapons in Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine.169 In 2003, the Nunn-Lugar 
Expansion Act opened the opportunity for other states, not only Russia, to participate. 
Nevertheless, last year, Moscow announced that it would not be renewing the program. 
The United States has made efforts to persuade their Russian counterparts to continue 
working together on this issue, because Russia, to this day, lacks adequate nuclear 
security. However, Moscow has long perceived U.S. assistance to be too invasive and, 
today, no longer needs foreign funds to secure its nation.170 Despite the recent 
disagreements, the two nations have collaborated closely and have taken special 
responsibility over the last couple of decades to ensure that WMDs do not make it to the 
hands of terrorist organizations. However, a number of barriers prevent a far–reaching 
joint collaboration, including the inability to share highly valuable information due to 
secrecy, political disagreements and differences, bureaucratic obstacles and “the sheer 
difficulty of preventing a potentially small, hard-to-detect team of terrorists from 
acquiring a small, hard-to-detect chunk of nuclear material with which to manufacture a 
crude bomb.”171 The United States, Russia and their international partners must not allow 
such barriers to impede collaborative processes, because nuclear terrorism poses a grave 
danger not only to the U.S. and Russia, but also to the rest of world. “If current 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 American Security Project, “The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: 
Securing and Safeguarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.” 
http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200068%20-
%20The%20Nunn-Lugar%20Cooperative%20Threat%20Reduction%20Program.pdf.  
170 Reshmi Kazi, “Extend the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,” 
International Relations, January 23, 2013. http://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/23/extend-the-
nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-program/.  
171 Pavel S. Zolotarev, Rolf Mowatt - Larssen, et al., “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat 
Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism,” Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science; 
International Affairs and the U.S.A.; Canada Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, May 2011, 14.  
	  	  
	   	   63	  
approaches toward eliminating the threat are not replaced with a sense of urgency and 
resolve, the question will become not if, but when, where, and on what scale the first act 
of nuclear terrorism occurs.”172 
 How Could Terrorists Acquire Nuclear Weapons? 
 
 
 The first ever U.S.-Russian Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism was 
published in 2011, by the Elbe Group.173 The report aims to evaluate the severity of a 
nuclear threat in today’s globalized world, and it advises a comprehensive joint strategy. 
The assessment explains different ways in which terrorists might acquire a nuclear 
weapon. While theft is a viable tactic, it would be the least likely option pursued by the 
terrorists. The reason is that countries in possession of such warheads implement 
intensely high security measures. For instance, many modern nuclear weapons are 
safeguarded by sophisticated electronic locks, known as ‘permissive action links’ (PALs), 
which make it extremely difficult for terrorists to detonate a bomb without exclusive 
information.174 Likewise, many nuclear warheads are designed to work only with very 
particular, intricate programs that prevent detonation, unless the weapon has gone 
through the expected flight to reach its target.175 Another option is for terrorists to attempt 
to retrieve the nuclear material from a stolen weapon; however, modern nuclear warheads 
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don’t contain enough material that would allow a high impact, crude bomb to be 
assembled. Nevertheless, while theft from a highly secured facility has low probability, 
acquiring a bomb from states outside the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) wouldn’t 
be as difficult in comparison.176 On the contrary, the most feasible way for terrorists to 
obtain a weapon of mass destruction is by constructing an improvised nuclear device 
(IND), with materials either stolen or purchased on the black market.177  
Total world stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium 
separated from spent fuel amount to nearly 2000 metric tons. Such weapons-
usable nuclear materials exist in hundreds of buildings in over 30 countries, under 
security conditions that range from excellent to appalling. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented 20 cases of theft or loss of HEU 
or plutonium confirmed by the states concerned, and additional cases are known 
to have occurred. What is not known is how many cases may have gone 
undetected, or how much stolen material may still be outside of state control. 
Theft of weapons-usable nuclear material, in short, is not a hypothetical concern 
but an ongoing reality.178 
 
Although obtaining the necessary materials, knowledge and technology essential for 
assembling an IND may be difficult, especially in secret, it is not impossible, which is 
the reason why the United States and Russia have taken the initiative to lead the 
nuclear world community toward more precautionary and preventive measures. 
 Sabotaging a nuclear facility represents the third way for terrorists to use 
nuclear materials for staging an attack. “Both al Qaeda and North Caucasus terrorist 
groups have considered sabotage of nuclear facilities and dispersal of radioactive 
material in a dirty bomb,” note the authors of the joint threat assessment.179 Lastly, 
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spreading radioactive material harmful to life over a vast area is yet another option, 
though, undesirable to the terrorists as death tolls would not occur immediately.  
 
Promoting Security 
 
 One way to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is to reduce the superfluous 
weapons of mass destruction and the materials used to make them, in both the United 
States and Russia. The two countries have made a number of efforts to pursue this goal 
and a number of bilateral agreements were implemented in order to assure greater 
security. In the U.S.–Russia Strategic Framework Declaration in 2008, the two powers 
announced their willingness to cooperate in order to reduce the threat of nuclear 
terrorism. 
We recognize the profound importance of preventing the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction and their means of delivery. We must prevent such weapons 
from falling into the hands of terrorists and those who support them. To this end, 
our two countries will provide global leadership on a wide range of cooperative 
efforts that will advance our common nonproliferation goals. These will include 
new approaches focused on environmentally friendly technologies that will 
support economic growth, promote the expansion of nuclear energy, and create a 
viable alternative to the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies.180 
 
 For instance, the U.S.-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement has 
asserted transparency and monitoring measures. The agreement, upon its expiration in 
2013 will have successfully eliminated 500 metric tons of HEU, which is equivalent to 
20,000 permanently removed WMDs from the Russian stockpile.181 Likewise, disposition 
of plutonium highlights another area of cooperation. In September 2000, Russia and the 
United States signed the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). 	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Discarding plutonium poses a difficult challenge when compared to the simple technique 
of HEU dissolution. One way of accomplishing this goal is shifting the use of plutonium 
by converting it into mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, which can be used as an energy source. 
This concept of reprocessing plutonium is the centerpiece of the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP), which is a “joint government/industry cost-shared effort to identify 
sites for new nuclear power plants, to develop and to bring to the market advanced 
standardized nuclear power plant designs, and to demonstrate streamlined regulatory 
processes” that will reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.182  
 The creation of the Bilateral Presidential Commission also brought to existence 
the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security. The unit 
recognizes the unique responsibility of the two nations to secure nuclear weapons and 
nuclear materials, which include storage and production facilities around the world.183 A 
number of sub-groups that fall under the Working Group’s leadership include: Nuclear 
Material Consolidation and Conversion, Plutonium Disposition-Combat Illicit 
Trafficking, International Safeguards System-Export Controls, Elimination of Weapons-
Grade Plutonium and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The 
panel has been successful in combining techniques, information and ideas. A recent 
outcome of the teamwork was a newly opened Nuclear Protective Training Center in 
Gorelovo, Russia. The facility is designed to train special protective personnel who are to 
safeguard nuclear institutions in Russia. Furthermore, the U.S.–Russia Academies of 
Science have been working together within the framework of the Working Group in order 
to explore and investigate conversion of research reactors to low enriched uranium fuel.  	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 The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism has also proven to be a 
successful component of the partnership, designed by President Bush and President Putin 
in 2006, today consisting of 85 nations. The initiative is a “voluntary international 
partnership of nations and international organizations that are committed to strengthening 
global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.”184 GICNT works 
together with national legal authorities within an international legal framework that 
includes the: Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540.185 ,186 
 In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also worked 
closely with the United States–Russia Working Group on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear 
Security. Russia and the United States are two of the thirty-five board members that 
comprise the organization. The IAEA was created in 1957, and over the course of the last 
fifty years, it has conducted research and given advice on nuclear energy, safety and 
security techniques. It delegated responsibility to its Department of Safeguards by Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which aims at preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons and technology around the globe.187 IAEA exercises its 
safeguard measures through a number of inspection practices of member nuclear facilities 
and materials. “On an average approximately 600 samples of nuclear material and over 
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400 environmental swipe samples are received and analyzed by the Safeguards 
Analytical Laboratories each year.”188 Nevertheless, IAEA has also implemented an 
action plan to combat nuclear terrorism with the turn of the 21st century. The board of 
directors has stressed that protection of nuclear facilities to be of outmost importance, and 
thus far, billions of dollars have been invested in such precautionary measures.  
 President Obama and President Medvedev signed the New START treaty 
(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) on April 8, 2010. Under the treaty conditions, the 
United States and Russia should reduce their nuclear missile launchers by half. There will 
also be a reduction of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a limit of 1,550, a two-
thirds decrease since the original START treaty in 1991. Other reductions will limit 
deployed missiles and bombers down to 700 and deployed and non-deployed launchers to 
800.189  
 The U.S. and Russia, as the world’s largest holders of nuclear warheads, have 
taken the responsibility to decrease the amount of nuclear weapons in the world and 
reverse their arms race actions taken during the Cold War. Today, the two nations are 
assuring the security of their nations by eliminating the amount of nuclear material 
around the globe. Although immense progress has been made through various bilateral 
and multilateral treaties, agreements and the creation of institutions, much more can be 
done. Today’s threat of terrorism is unpredictable and unstable and the proximity of 
Russia’s vast amount of nuclear materials to unstable states such as Afghanistan and 	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Pakistan, along with the rise of Islamic extremism in Chechnya and Uzbekistan concern 
Washington and Moscow.  
The recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership (2003 and 2008) offer a 
meticulously researched religious ruling, or fatwa, for the use of weapons of mass 
destruction in the mass slaughter of civilians. It is clear that the group desires 
high-end WMD, whether in the form of biological weapons or of nuclear weapons 
capable of killing millions of people and causing mass economic damage... There 
are chilling similarities between the warning and planning cycle associated with 
the 9/11 attack, and rituals associated with al-Qaeda’s WMD statements. The 
timing of al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s 2008 fatwa—which 
meticulously justifies an unprecedented attack on an almost unimaginable scale of 
destruction—may have started the clock ticking for an attack capable of fulfilling 
al-Zawahiri’s promise to elevate the level of violence to a new scale.190 
 
Thus, today, more then ever, the United States and Russia need to put aside their 
differences and concentrate on implementing preventive measures to contain the threat of 
nuclear terrorism, which could cost their nations hundreds of thousands of lives. Corporal 
Gregory Kilcommons remarks that the U.S.–Russian close collaboration is the foundation 
for a nuclear safe world. 
I believe a strong Russian-US relationship is vital as we move forward due to the 
pursuit of nuclear arms by so many nations.  Unfortunately, in terms of Iran, it 
does not seem like we are on the same page.  Cooperation on this matter, as well 
as North Korea, would prove extremely valuable in acting as a deterrent towards 
both nations’ nuclear dreams.191   
 
 Pakistan 
 
 Corporal Gregory Kilcommons also argues that military ostracism of the Taliban 
only leads to a further buildup of the Taliban forces in Pakistan. Any further 
radicalization of the Pakistani population poses a great threat to Pakistan, as well the rest 
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of the world. Pakistan currently has the fastest growing nuclear weapon program in the 
world, possessing enough fissile material to produce over a 100 warheads.192  
By 2021, however, Pakistan is expected to double the number of weapons in its 
arsenal to at least 200, surpassing the United Kingdom. Soon thereafter, analysts 
say there is a good chance that Pakistan will even surpass France to become the 
world’s third largest nuclear-armed state.193 
 
Security conflicts and disputes with India, over Kashmir, have led the regime to an arms 
race. Pakistan’s handlings of its nuclear materials are not very transparent; therefore, it is 
hard to assess how diligently the country handles management and transportation of its 
nuclear materials. The world leaders are very concerned that Pakistan may have, what is 
commonly referred to as ‘loose nukes,’ which implies a chance of nuclear warheads or 
nuclear material used to build WMDs falling into the wrong hands.194 Osama bin Laden’s 
undetected presence near a Pakistani military base makes the issue of nuclear weapon 
safeguarding more worrisome. Nevertheless, Pakistan argues that its nuclear sites are 
heavily guarded and that great security measures have been assumed. Some scholars 
agree that not even the United States knows exactly where Pakistan’s stocks are, as 
Islamabad has implemented a number of decoy sites and uses a secret underground 
transportation system to transport its materials.195 Washington has appreciated Pakistan’s 
cooperation in the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and in return it 
has been known to look the other way from Pakistan’s expanding nuclear program. 	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Nevertheless, as Pakistan increases its nuclear stocks, the more of a challenge it will be to 
protect its sites. The authors of the U.S.–Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear 
Terrorism remark that Umma-Tameer-E-Nau (UTN), a militant network who has been 
suspected of supplying al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden with information about 
constructing nuclear weapons, is of current concern in Pakistan.196 Furthermore, there 
have been a number of reported attempted attacks on Pakistani nuclear holdings. These 
incidences include an attack on a storage facility in Sargodha in November 2007, an 
attack on a nuclear airbase at Kamara in December 2007 and an attack on a number of 
Wah facility entry points, known to be one of Pakistan’s focal nuclear holdings.197 The 
possibility of Pakistani ‘loose nukes’ poses a far greater threat to the United States than 
Iranian possession of WMD per se. Now that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is winding 
down, Washington should concern itself more with Pakistan’s rapidly growing nuclear 
program and lead bilateral and international efforts to encourage Pakistan to sign the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 
 Russia is also concerned about Taliban’s increasing presence in Pakistan and the 
Pakistani nuclear program. At a press conference in 2009, Ivanov voiced that Russia is 
very concerned with Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and that in order for lasting peace to be 
achieved in Afghanistan, Pakistan needs to be stabilized.198  Also, in an interview with 
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Bloomberg Television in Moscow, Ivanov commented on the dangers of the Pakistani-
Afghan border.  
It’s obvious to anybody that the Pakistani-Afghan border is a safe haven for 
terrorists, for the Taliban. They hit and run back to Pakistan. So you have to deal 
with both. Both are very unstable... We obviously see that the present system of 
missile non-proliferation doesn’t work. More and more countries are laying their 
hands on very dangerous missile technologies.199 
 
Nevertheless, Russo-Pakistani ties have become closer over the years. In 2006, Pakistan 
became an observing member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is 
a Eurasian security organization, founded by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Russia wants to tighten relations with Pakistan for several 
reasons, but mostly because it is concerned with security, instability and the presence of 
foreign militants from Central Asia and Chechnya. Russia has a lot to think about when it 
comes to securing the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) borders after the 
withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO troops. Considering the proximity of Pakistan’s rising 
instabilities to Russia, Moscow will want to have reliable relations with Islamabad. More 
so, the presence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
and northern Afghanistan is also very concerning to Russia, because the coalition wants 
to form an Islamic Central Asian caliphate and it sympathizes with violent Chechen 
organizations. 
 The United States and Russia, while acknowledging the problematic standing of 
nuclear warheads in Pakistan, have not taken any strong joint initiatives to better the 
situation. This may be for the best however, considering the very different relationship 
that Pakistan has with Russia and the United States. This does not mean that the two 
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could not still work together to find ways to solve the issue, if not jointly, then taking 
individual actions. 
 North Korea: Threat of Generating Nuclear Terrorism 
 
 
 North Korea’s strong dislike of the United States has been long acknowledged 
and has remained worrisome to the U.S. ever since the end of the Korean War in the 
1950s. The North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, took power after his father, Kim Jong-Il, 
passed away in 2011. Since, the new president has made a number of provocative acts 
against the Unites States and its allies, especially against South Korea. The threats are not 
news to the South Korean and American Presidents and their allies, as the former leader 
had often used hostile rhetoric and bravado intimidations to obtain Western aid. The top 
American commander in South Korea, General James D. Thurman, reports: 
The North Koreans want the international community to feed their people, fuel 
their factories and fill their bank accounts. If North Korea were a self-sufficient 
enterprise, we would have a much bigger problem on our hands.200 
 
However, Kim Jong-Il seemed to know better than to actually execute any serious attacks 
and instead, used threats as bargaining chips. It is worrisome that little is known about the 
new president; his short time in office hasn’t allowed the world to familiarize itself with 
his personality and intentions. The issue at hand is not only that North Korea possesses 
weapons of mass destruction and that it has the ability to produce more, but that for the 
first time, it is implying nuclear threats. Recently, Kim Jong-un’s torrent of warnings to 
use nuclear warheads on American and South Korean cities has heightened tensions. The 
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Obama administration, while perceiving the warnings to be acts of bravado, has 
responded with precautions. It has cancelled the intercontinental ballistic missile test with 
South Korea, a yearly joint field exercise, in order to avoid any misunderstandings.201 
Also in response, the U.S. and its allies have tightened the preexisting sanctions against 
North Korea due to its production of nuclear weapon, whilst reinforcing missile defense 
systems to better counter a possible attack.  
 Nevertheless, most worrisome is North Korea’s recent announcement, in February 
2013, that its nuclear weapons are for ‘sale.’ For production of nuclear weapons only two 
elements are needed: highly enriched uranium and plutonium. There is evidence that 
North Korea is capable of manufacturing a number of such weapons annually. Moreover, 
the fact that it is capable of producing uranium is equally bothersome, as the substance is 
easier to market than plutonium, less detectable, easier to export and building bombs with 
uranium is less complicated.202 It is concerning when considering who would be 
interested in buying these weapons of mass destruction and who North Korea would be 
willing to sell them to. As the former Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, noted, 
“[North Koreans] will sell anything they have to, to anybody who has the cash to buy 
it.”203 The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist organization would 
lead to devastating outcomes and possibly claim thousands of innocent lives. The bomb 
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dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 was a rudimentary, uranium-fueled model that killed 
about 100,000 people.204  
While Al Qaeda’s core is greatly diminished and its resources depleted, the man 
who succeeded Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri has been seeking nuclear 
weapons for more than a decade. And then there are Israel’s enemies, including 
wealthy individuals in some Arab countries, who might buy a bomb for the 
militant groups Hezbollah or Hamas... If terrorists explode a single nuclear bomb 
in an American city in the near future, there is a serious possibility that the core of 
the weapon will have come from North Korea.205 
 
President Obama has previously stated that nuclear terrorism is “the single biggest threat 
to U.S. security.”206  
 Moscow’s concerns are also heightened. President Putin has thus far supported 
President Obama’s approach, especially when the U.S. cancelled its military training with 
South Korea. “I think we should all thank the U.S. leadership for this step. I hope it will 
be noticed by our North Korean partners, that certain conclusions will be drawn; 
everyone will calm down and start joint work to ease the situation,” said Putin.207 Russia 
is very much in favor of conflict resolution and wants to revive the ‘Six-Party Talks’ with 
the American, North and South Korean, Chinese and Japanese leaders. While Russia and 
North Korea were close allies during the Cold War, today relations have weakened. 
Russia would only help North Korea as far as facilitating and partaking in friendly talks 
and negotiations. Nevertheless, it is important to mention the lingering mistrust in U.S.–
Russian relations has the capacity to paralyze the bilateral partnership and lead to 	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consequences that otherwise, could be prevented. For instance, Dr. Stephen J. Blank 
writes in Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy that Russia fears 
the U.S. and its allies’ exploitation of this crisis to strengthen its regional military 
presence – if not more than the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea.208,209  
Neither will Russia or China be able to exercise any decisive restraining leverage 
upon North Korea. Therefore, North Korea can behave provocatively at what it 
believes to be a minimum or at least manageable risk. While this behavior has 
allowed North Korea to get nuclear weapons without paying what it considers to 
be an unbearable price, it also exposes its supposed “backers” to the consequences 
of these great risks taken in disregard of their interests and without their 
knowledge or acceptance of the risks for them in that behavior. Yet until now, 
Russian and Chinese behavior has allowed North Korea to keep on behaving in 
this provocative manner. As a result, North Korea has repeatedly been able to 
outmaneuver the other five members of the process.210 
 
The standing threat of North Korea will only strengthen U.S. relations with South Korea 
and Japan, eventually isolating Russia and her self-delegated role of mediating conflicts 
and maintaining peace in the region. However, Russia has also shown interest in building 
an oil pipeline through the Korean Peninsula, supplying both North and South Korea with 
energy.211 Possible disruptions of oil flow by the North, for instance, could potentially 
escalate tensions on the peninsula. Kim Jong-un’s new vision to sell nuclear stock should 
be more worrisome to Russia considering her alleged international terrorism problems in 
Chechnya and Chechen association to Afghanistan. If the U.S. and Russia allow poor 
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communication to progress due to distrust, then the threat of terrorists acquiring nuclear 
materials will only increase. Another concern is that further tightening of sanctions on 
North Korea will only provide its leadership with a greater incentive to sell its nuclear 
material and weapons to other countries and non-state actors, further threatening world 
stability.   
CONCLUSION 
  
 Different ideologies and perspectives have led the U.S.–Russian relationship into 
the Cold War and have posed a barrier to closely-knit relations. Russia’s isolation under 
the Mongolian empire set it further apart from the developing Western world, while 
creating a sense of dominance the government held over the society. This is important 
even in today’s politics, as the Russian outlook on the world is different from that of the 
majority of Western nations. Russia believes that it has an important task to provide 
peace and security in the world, particularly in the regions surrounding it. However, the 
American aims to defend democracies from the Soviet communistic, Marxist ideals have 
often brought instability to regions like Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979, in support of the newly created socialist government, the United 
States supplied the mujahedeen with resources and funds in order to counter the Soviet 
presence and the socialist forces. This proxy war between the two powers essentially 
helped uphold, what is today known as international terrorism. The terrorists who 
prospered from American funds, not only supported the Chechen struggle against Russia, 
but also had an agenda against the West, particularly the United States. Terrorist 
networks like al Qaeda believed America to be a power-hungry colonizing force that 
created chaos in the Middle East, depleted countries of their valuable resources and 
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created instabilities, while not caring very much for the lives of Muslims. The issue of 
international terrorism bedevils the securities of both Russia and the United States and 
has created a common goal to eradicate its threats. Afghanistan is believed to be the 
breading ground for terrorists, which is why most U.S.–Russian efforts have concentrated 
on diminishing its sources of funding and influence in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s vast 
production of opium and heroin impact the livelihood of Russia’s population and 
therefore, provide yet another incentive for Russia’s involvement in the region. The U.S. 
finds the drug issue to be equally as important to fight terrorism. Thus, U.S.–Russian 
interests very much overlap, which is why the two powers have decided to tackle the 
issue together. The American presence in Afghanistan, while not welcomed by Moscow, 
helps Russia reach its goal of diminishing the influence of narcotics and the further 
spread of extremism throughout the region that could find its way to Chechnya and to 
Russian borders through other terrorist networks in the region, like IMU. 
 Russia and the Unites States initiated cooperation mostly after the 9/11 attacks on 
the United States, when terrorism became America’s foremost security issue. Before that 
period, Russia often used the notion of international terrorism to justify its brutal actions 
in Chechnya during the 1990s, arguing that jihadists like Ibn-al Khattab made their way 
to Russia, radicalized Chechens and inflicted terrorist attacks on Russia. The West very 
much perceived Chechnya as an internal conflict initiated by a separatists group of people 
fighting for independence, rather than a concern of international terrorism, all the while 
criticizing Russia’s human rights violations in the region. Nevertheless, after 9/11, the 
U.S., while still disagreeing with Russia on Chechnya, made an effort to reduce the 
amount of criticism and aimed to increase cooperation. Putin and Clinton took the first 
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steps toward closer relations even before 9/11; however, the attacks expanded this 
cooperation and took a wider range of matters into consideration, such as the possibility 
of nuclear terrorism. Nonetheless, a number of events between 2002-2008 prevented 
progress toward warmer ties, until the reset of relations under President Obama and 
President Medvedev that led to the creation of the U.S.–Russia Bilateral Presidential 
Commission, which stabilized the relationship and allowed for a closer partnership. The 
Commission allowed the two countries to work together on a wide-range of matters, 
including counterterrorism and counternarcotics, two areas that became intertwined 
issues in Afghanistan. Under the Bilateral Presidential Commission, the U.S.–Russia 
collaboration reached unprecedented levels. The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies held a conference in 2010, where Russia's Special Presidential Counterterrorism 
Representative, Anatoly Safonov and the State Department's former Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, Daniel Benjamin shared their opinions about the new cooperative 
efforts in countering terrorism. Stefano quotes a three-star American general: 
I am sitting here and I am pinching myself on the ear, I cannot believe that I am 
present at this meeting. I am an expert on Russia and the Soviet Union and I know 
your aces and your resources, but never, I never even in the worst nightmares 
could imagine that I was going to be sitting in Moscow and that Russian generals 
would be reporting to me on military matters and Afghanistan and that they would 
be sharing this kind of information with me, each time I am asking myself if it is 
real or if it is not.212 
 
For the first time, the two powers carried out a joint military operation in Afghanistan, 
shared intelligence on a frequent basis and worked together bilaterally and multilaterally 
to diminish a common threat. Their accomplishments in Afghanistan have mixed results. 
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The country is still the largest producer of heroin in the world, the population is still 
living in poverty and issues of corruption are still widespread. That is not to say that 
things have not improved. The investments in infrastructure, security force training and 
education have had visible impacts. Corporal Gregory Kilcommons argues that 
American, NATO, and Russian efforts have not been very successful because poppy 
cultivation is a great incentive to earn money and since international forces like ISAF 
have put Afghanistan in a position for a great security vacuum to occur as the Taliban is 
likely make its way back from Pakistan into Afghanistan through their very porous 
borders. The economic hardships fuel corruption, and therefore, any reforms made to the 
governmental system, most importantly to the judicial branch, are not very likely to 
succeed. In conclusion the U.S. and Russia have not been very successful eradicating 
narcotics, nor have they made any lasting improvements in government reform. However, 
they have trained about 300,000 ANSF and ALP forces, whose capacities will be put to a 
real test once international personnel is no longer there to provide assistance. Corporal 
Kilcommons also points out that “another important aspect to note is the importance and 
popularity of drugs in Afghan culture.  I sincerely wish I were joking when I said that 
75% of the Afghan soldiers I met or worked with were high on one drug or another. With 
drugs so rampant within the force that is supposed to help eradicate them, how is any 
progress supposed to be made?” Kilcommons makes an excellent argument, which is the 
reason why it not very likely that Afghanistan will succeed in its efforts to eradicate 
drugs or to protect its nation from the Taliban’s influence within or outside its borders.  
 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the U.S. and Russia have made 
significant progress in installing precautionary measures and protecting nuclear stocks 
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from terrorists’ acquisition. The two powers have taken serious responsibility to eliminate 
the dangers of nuclear terrorism and that is an area of cooperation that has been 
successful. However, while the relationship after the “reset’ improved, there are still 
barriers that stand in the way of full cooperation. The remains of the Cold War mistrust 
still linger and sometimes prevent full cooperation. While they need each other to better 
counter terrorism, and while sharing intelligence seems to have been a valuable aspect of 
the relationship, the U.S. and Russia are two powerful nations competing on the world 
stage. Russians have perceived the NATO enlargement as a security threat. Russia does 
not like having the United States in its backyard and would rather have the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) be the primary means of stabilizing the region. 
Though it is understandable that a simple reset button, symbolizing the ‘reset’ of U.S-
Russia relations, that former U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton presented the Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov with in Geneva, cannot erase decades of suspicion, the two 
powers need to continue building trust. With more certainty, the two could increase 
cooperation and would be more successful in preventing terrorism and providing security 
for their nations. However, closer cooperation is not very likely in the near future. The 
two nations are most likely to continue working together under the Bilateral Presidential 
Commission, maintaining diplomatic ties, but will likely continue to be wary of each 
other’s intentions and actions.  
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Addendum 
Iran 
 In the aftermath of September 11, U.S.- Iranian relations seemed to have been 
warming up as Secretary of State, Colin Powell, shook hands with the Iranian foreign 
minister, Kamal Kharrazi, at the U.N. headquarters in New York City. This was the 
friendliest the two countries have been since the 1979-1981-hostage-crisis of the U.S. 
Embassy in Tehran. However in 2002, in the State of the Union Address, President 
George Bush grouped Iran with "an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the 
world."213 Later that month, Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. National Security Adviser, 
remarked that "Iran's direct support of regional and global terrorism and its aggressive 
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, belie any good intentions it displayed in 
the days after the world's worst terrorist attacks in history.”214 It still remains unclear why 
the U.S.-Iranian relations took such a sharp turn, however, some would argue that 
President Bush’s announcement, that you are either with us or against us on the War on 
Terror, could explain the situation. Iran is believed to have supported the insurgency in 
Afghanistan by supplying food, clothing, funds and even personnel, in order to challenge 
the government installed through the Bonn agreements.215 It also has been known to 
support the terrorist organization, Hezbollah, in Lebanon, whose statements imply that its 
sole purpose is to annihilate Israel, and the U.S. also delegates responsibility to Hezbollah 
for attacks on the U.S. Embassy in 1983. Iranian supply of funds, weapons and even 
training to Hezbollah troops created tensions with the West. The U.S. Department of 	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State estimated, in its 2010 report, that Iran provides Hezbollah with roughly $100 to 
$200 million dollars a year.216 Hamas is believed to be yet another group sponsored by 
Iran and al Qaeda member have also been known to flee to Iran, where they are believed 
to have found and established sanctuaries.  
 Iran has been seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction for decades and 
previously argued that its nuclear plants are to be used for peaceful nuclear-energy 
purposes. A former CIA Director, James Woolsey, notes in response: “there is no 
underlying [reason] for one of the greatest oil producers in the world to need to get into 
the nuclear [energy] business."217 Also in 2001, Russia and Iran signed an $800 million 
dollar worth contract that would allow the partnership to build one of its largest plants at 
Bushehr, which would be monitored by the IAEA. 
     Nevertheless, Iran is believed to have other clandestine nuclear sites that are under 
strict military control. Recently, a number of these hidden reactors, used for producing 
HEU, have been discovered. The IAEA noted a number of times that it does not believe 
Iranian nuclear centrifuges are aimed for its energy program. In the recent 2013 report, 
the IAEA remarks that there are a number of different indicators that Iran might have 
WMD building intentions. 
While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear 
material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its 
Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, 
including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to 
provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material 
and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran 
is in peaceful activities. [Furthermore,] It is a matter of concern that the 
extensive and significant activities which have taken place since February 2012 	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at the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has repeatedly 
requested access will have seriously undermined the Agency’s ability to 
undertake effective verification. The Agency reiterates its request that Iran, 
without further delay, provide both access to that location and substantive 
answers to the Agency’s detailed questions regarding the Parchin site and the 
foreign expert.218 
 
The international community has taken the threat of Iranian development of nuclear 
weapons seriously, for instance, the U.S. has held sanctions against Iran for many years. 
Recently the U.S. passed National Defense Authorization Acts of 2012 and 2013, “which 
placed sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and foreign institutions doing business with 
the Central Bank of Iran. Those sanctions targeted major buyers of Iranian oil, forcing 
them to significantly reduce the amounts of oil they buy from Iran and to start paying for 
oil with goods instead of cash.”219 
 On the other hand, Russia believes that Iran has a right to develop a peaceful 
nuclear energy program and opposes any unilateral sanctions against the country, because 
it finds any such actions to be counterproductive, instead she is very much in favor of 
negotiations and talks with the Big Six on the issue.220 Russia has been less trustworthy 
of Iran, and despite her efforts to train thousands of scientists at the Bushehr plant, she 
has little to do with the recent Iranian development of HEU. 
  It is also important to bear in mind that the recent talks with North Korea could 
impact the situation in Iran. Valerie Lincy, executive director of the	  Wisconsin Project on 
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Nuclear Arms Control, a Washington-based research and advocacy group, noted in an 
interview, “I would imagine the lessons they’re drawing are not the ones the Western 
powers would like: That you can weather sanctions, and renege on previous agreements, 
and ultimately if you stand fast, you’ll get what you’re looking for.” 221 Iran poses a 
major terrorist threat and every effort should be taken to contain the situation, especially 
by the United States and Russia, despite their opposing views on sanctions.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
U.S. Department of State List of International Terrorist Organizations222 
 
 
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Date 
Designated Name 
10/8/1997 Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 
10/8/1997 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
10/8/1997 Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) 
10/8/1997 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) 
10/8/1997 Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) (IG) 
10/8/1997 HAMAS 
10/8/1997 Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) 
10/8/1997 Hizballah 
10/8/1997 Kahane Chai (Kach) 
10/8/1997 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Kongra-Gel) 
10/8/1997 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
10/8/1997 National Liberation Army (ELN) 
10/8/1997 Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) 
10/8/1997 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
10/8/1997 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF) 
10/8/1997 PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC) 
10/8/1997 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
10/8/1997 Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) 
10/8/1997 Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) 
10/8/1997 Shining Path (SL) 
10/8/1999 al-Qa’ida (AQ) 
9/25/2000 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
5/16/2001 Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) 
9/10/2001 United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.  
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12/26/2001 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) 
12/26/2001 Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) 
3/27/2002 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) 
3/27/2002 Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) 
3/27/2002 al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
8/9/2002 Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) 
10/23/2002 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 
1/30/2003 Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) 
3/22/2004 Ansar al-Islam (AAI) 
7/13/2004 Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) 
12/17/2004 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 
12/17/2004 al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) 
6/17/2005 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) 
10/11/2005 Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) 
3/5/2008 Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) 
3/18/2008 al-Shabaab 
5/18/2009 Revolutionary Struggle (RS) 
7/2/2009 Kata'ib Hizballah (KH) 
1/19/2010 al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
8/6/2010 Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) 
9/1/2010 Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 
11/4/2010 Jundallah 
5/23/2011 Army of Islam (AOI) 
9/19/2011 Indian Mujahedeen (IM) 
3/13/2012 Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) 
5/30/2012 Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) 
9/19/2012 Haqqani Network (HQN) 
3/22/2013 Ansar al-Dine (AAD) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Federation of Russia List of International Terrorist Organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date 
Designated Name 
2/14/2003 Supreme Military Majlis Shura of the United Forces of Caucasian Mujahideen 
2/14/2003 Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan 
2/14/2003 Base ("Al-Qaeda") 
2/14/2003 Asbat al-Ansar 
2/14/2003 Holy War ("Al-Jihad" or "Egyptian Islamic Jihad") 
2/14/2003 Islamic Group ("Al-Gama'a al-Islamiya") 
2/14/2003 Muslim Brotherhood ("Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun") 
2/14/2003 Islamic Liberation Party ("Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami") 
2/14/2003 Lashkar-e-Taiba 
2/14/2003 Islamic Group ("Jamaat-e-Islami") 
2/14/2003 Taleban 
2/14/2003 Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly "The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan") 
2/14/2003 Social Reform Society ("Jamiat al-Islah al-Ijtimai") 
2/14/2003 RRevival of Islamic Heritage Society ("Jamiat Ihya at-Turaz al-Islami") 
2/14/2003 House of the Two Holy ("Al-Haramain") 
6/02/2006 Jund al-Sham 
6/02/2006 Islamic Jihad - Jamaat Mujahideen 
11/13/2008 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (former name - "the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
11/13/2008 Caucasus Emirate ("Caucasus Emirate") 
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Original Russian Text (Translated via Google Translate):223 
 
Решением Верховного Суда Российской Федерации от 14 февраля 2003 года 
признаны террористическими и запрещена деятельность на территории 
Российской Федерации следующих организации: 
  
1. «Высший военный Маджлисуль Шура Объединенных сил моджахедов  
 Кавказа», 
2. «Конгресс народов Ичкерии и Дагестана», 
3. «База» («Аль-Каида»), 
4. «Асбат аль-Ансар», 
5. «Священная война» («Аль-Джихад» или «Египетский исламский джихад»), 
6. «Исламская группа» («Аль-Гамаа аль-Исламия»), 
7. «Братья-мусульмане» («Аль-Ихван аль-Муслимун»), 
8. «Партия исламского освобождения» («Хизб ут-Тахрир аль-Ислами»), 
9. «Лашкар-И-Тайба», 
10. «Исламская группа» («Джамаат-и-Ислами»), 
11. «Движение Талибан», 
12. «Исламская партия Туркестана» (бывшее «Исламское движение 
 Узбекистана»), 
13. «Общество социальных реформ» («Джамият аль-Ислах аль-Иджтимаи»), 
14. «Общество возрождения исламского наследия» («Джамият Ихья ат-Тураз 
 аль-Ислами»), 
15. «Дом двух святых» («Аль-Харамейн») 
  
Решением Верховного Суда Российской Федерации от 2 июня 2006 года признаны 
террористическими и запрещена деятельность на территории Российской 
Федерации следующих организации: 
16. «Джунд аш-Шам» 
17. «Исламский джихад - Джамаат моджахедов» 
  
Решением Верховного Суда Российской Федерации от 13 ноября 2008 года 
признаны террористическими и запрещена деятельность на территории Российской 
Федерации следующих организации: 
 18. «Аль-Каида в странах исламского Магриба» (прежнее название - 
«Салафистская группа проповеди и джихада») 
  
Решением Верховного Суда Российской Федерации от 08 февраля 2010 года 
признана террористической и запрещена  деятельность на территории Российской 
Федерации международной организации: 
 19. «Имарат Кавказ» («Кавказский Эмират»). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 “Единый федеральный список организаций, признанных террористическими 
Верховным Судом Российской Федерации” (Single federal list of organizations 
recognized as terrorist by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation). 
http://www.mrsu.ru/ru/antiterror/theory.php?ID=15258. 
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